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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"the populist radical right is one of the few academic topics that one can study without
having to defend the relevance of one's choice."
(Mudde 2007, 1)
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, few topics in domestic European politics have generated as
much recent scholarly attention as radical right political parties. Most of this scholarship
has been devoted to explaining the rise of the party family (either initial electoral
breakthroughs, electoral consolidation, or both) through external socio-economic factors
(Betz 1994; Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2007), external shifting political spaces (Kitschelt and
McGann 1995; Rydgren 2004; Schain et al. 2002), and internal party factors (Carter
2005; Mudde 2000, 2007; Schain et al. 2002; Taggart 2000). With these explanations
often comes an (often unstated) underlying assumption that these parties are dangerous,
or at least undesirable. Many books have been written on this process, but when (or if)
they address the impact of the radical right, they do so in an (often underdeveloped)
single chapter toward the end of the book. While there is a growing body of scholarship
that is beginning to address the impact of the radical right (for example see Schain et al.
2002), the topic needs theoretical development. Although the effects ofthe radical right
2are not yet well understood, unless these parties have an impact on politics, it would seem
that the amount of scholarly attention that has been devoted to them is unfounded. This
project is intended to defend the choices of scholars to study the radical right by focusing
on the ways in which the radical right can alter the political system. A likely site for
potential impacts within the political system may be in mainstream political parties
(Mudde 2007, 282). I will therefore explore the effects of radical right parties on the
positioning of other political parties spatially. I will do this through analyzing movements
in party positioning over time on an overall right/left dimension, as well as on the issue of
immigration.
This introductory chapter will first take some time to conceptualize the parties of
the radical right and to discuss some potential effects these parties may have. I attempt to
capture the core ideological features of radical right parties, but at the same time I
acknowledge that while all of these parties share some important features, there is some
ideological diversity within the radical right as well. After defining the parties this study
is based upon, I discuss some potential effects. Certain scholars have suggested that there
may be direct policy effects and potential broad social effects of radical right parties, but
these studies have been relatively inconclusive since the effects are difficult to attribute
directly the radical right parties themselves. Finally, I briefly layout the plan for the rest
of the project.
DEFINING THE PARTIES OF INTEREST
In Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (2007) Cas Mudde spends
considerable time defining what it means to be a party of the radical right, and
3categorizing empirical examples into his definition. Ultimately, he arrives at a
hierarchical definition of populist radical right parties, based upon a ladder ofabstraction
(Sartori 1970, 1991). Other authors have defined the radical right with emphases upon on
different components. However, differences in emphases do not mean that these alternate
definitions are not necessarily in direct conflict with Mudde's definition. This is aside
from the place of neoliberalism. Some have argued that a neoliberal economic
philosophy is a fundamental part of the radical right (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann
1995) while Mudde suggests that neoliberalism is only secondary. Betz argues that
radical right parties have "two faces". First, they espouse a neoliberal economic
philosophy that is based on the idea that the welfare state has led to an oversized
bureaucracy, excessive taxes, and unreasonable debt despite its promises of social justice.
As a result, these parties propose less regulation, less state spending, and lower taxes.
Anti-immigrant sentiment arrives in the story because immigration is blamed for these
economic issues (Betz 1994). While Mudde would argue that the radical right is nativist
at its core, which results in neoliberal policy preferences, Betz suggests that the radical
right is first and foremost based upon a neoliberal ideology, that gets manifested in
nativist policies because immigration is blamed for the economic problems of society.
Kitchelt and McGann argue that the radical right is the political opposite of the new left.
The "New Left stands for 'leftist' income redistribution by way ofencompassing social
policies in the economic sphere and 'libertarian' democratic participation and maximum
individual autonomy in politics and the cultural sphere" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 2).
It then follows that the radical right "advocates rightist free market economics and
4'authoritarian' hierarchical arrangements in politics, together with a limitation of
diversity and individual autonomy in cultural expressions" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995,
2). By constructing the radical right as a response to, and the opposite of, the new left,
Kitchelt and McGann necessarily link it first and foremost to neoliberal economic
policies. It has since been shown that the parties commonly included in the group
thought of as being of the radical right take strong stances on the right with regard to
social issues, but their positions vary widely and remain purposefully vague on economic
issues (Rovny 2009). Ultimately, Mudde's defmition seems to take this variation into
account and most accurately captures the core sentiment of these parties as well as the
main group of parties commonly considered to be radical right. I want to make clear
however, that while these components are prevalent in the literature, they are not
universally accepted and applied.
Mudde builds his defmition of the radical right party family that is based upon the
core ideological concepts of nationalism and xenophobia that in combination form
nativism. These can be seen as "individually shaped coathangers on which additional
concepts may be draped" (Freeden 1997, 5; Mudde 2007, 15). These ideologies form the
core upon which more complete ideologies and political agendas are built. Nationalism
is defined as "a political doctrine that strives for the congruence of the cultural and
political unit, Le. the nation and the state, respectively" (Mudde 2007, 16), but this alone
does not capture the central sentiment of the radical right. For that, he in turn adds the
concept of nativism, (which is formed by adding xenophobia [from the Greek xenos
meaning foreigner and phobos meaning fear] to nationalism). It then follows that
5nativism is "an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by
members of the native group ("the nation") and that nonnative elements (persons and
ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state" (Mudde 2007, 19).
With this emphasis on nationalism, natives, and nonnatives, the radical right is
necessarily built around an agenda of identity politics that "is always based upon an 'us-
them' distinction" (Mudde 2007,63). Both the included groups and the excluded groups
that form these identities are necessarily socially constructed, or, in other words, they are
"imagined communities" (Anderson 1983). In order to construct the native identity, "one
needs to delineate the boundaries with other identities, i.e. those of nonnatives" (Mudde
2007, 63). Such identity formation is especially important in the development of radical
right parties because not only is the world divided based upon the distinction of "us" and
"them" in which nonnatives are otherized, but it is also divided into "good" and "bad"
where the other is demonized in a sense ofmorality (Taggart 2000). All political issues
are then viewed through this lens.
Upon the core of nativism, Mudde adds authoritarianism to the definition of the
radical right. By this he is referring to "the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which
infringements of authority are to be punished severely" (Mudde 2007, 23). The final
necessary feature of the definition is populism, which refers to an ideology that sees
society as being made up of two homogeneous and antagonistic groups; "the pure
people" and "the corrupt elite" (Mudde 2007; Taggart 2000), fitting closely with the way
in which the other is demonized in the formation of national identity. Thus, Mudde
arrives at the term populist radical right parties. In order to be considered a member of
6this party family, a party must have all three core concepts: nativism, authoritarianism,
and populism.
While other scholars do not necessarily define the radical right in a way that is in
direct opposition to this definition based on essential ideological features, there are some
instances of alternative emphasis. For instance, Piero Ignazi (2003) places more
emphasis on what he has labeled the anti-system aspect of the radical right parties. I see
this as included in Mudde's definition under the populist and nativist characteristics, but
it is not emphasized in these terms. It is captured within populism because it reflects a
distrust of the corrupt elite, and it is reflected in the concept of nativism so far as it is
applied to European Union (which can be thought of as nonnative influence over national
affairs). It is also more directly apparent in the anti-democracy element of the extreme
right in Mudde' s ladder of abstraction, but he does not view this as a necessary
component of the radical right (Mudde 2007,24). This means that while some parties
that are considered to be radical right contain this characteristic, not all of them do, and it
is not a core ideological feature. For Ignazi it is crucial to emphasize the anti-system
nature of the radical right that seeks to undermine the democratic institutions because
democratic pluralism is at odds with the harmony and homogenization these parties seek.
Although not articulated in the same terms, this does not conflict with Mudde's
definition. In fact, it can be seen as a manifestation of the nativist and populist features
he describes. It is nativist because it seeks to homogenize the nation and the state, and it
is populist because it seeks to locate the power within the pure people rather than the
corrupt elite or the nonnatives. Similarly, Paul Taggart (1998) emphasizes a place for
7Euro-skepticism as a key component of the radical right, but this can also be included in
Mudde's definition. Euro-skepticism is merely a manifestation of nativism, or a reaction
against a particular outgroup that is outside of the nation as well as outside of the state.
Elisabeth Carter (2005) seeks to broaden the group of parties included in her
study in order to increase the soundness of the basis for generalization, and thus opts for a
more inclusive definition. She includes parties that have been labeled as on the border or
fringe of the radical right party family by other scholars (Ignazi 2003). Her defmition is
based on two anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements: "a rejection of the
fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state"
and "a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality" (Carter 2005, 17). This
more general definition allows for additional parties to be included in her study than have
been by other scholars. Carter acknowledges that borderline cases do exist, and
establishing a dividing line between the mainstream right and the radical is less than
obvious, but maintains that this "does not mean that parties of the extreme right cannot be
identified and analyzed" (Carter 2005, 20). There "is a large number of political parties
whose extreme right status is not debated" (Mudde 2000, 16; quoted in Carter 2005,20).
I have settled on using the term radical right, and the definition of a radical right
political party used throughout this project is based upon principles outlined by Elisabeth
Carter and Cas Mudde. I will be including the more general anti-constitutional and anti-
democratic components of Carter's definition, but will also emphasize core ideological
features of nativism (made up of nationalism and xenophobia) and populism central to
8Mudde's definition. 1 Doing so maintains an ideological core of the radical right party
family, but allows for a certain level of relativism as the values, procedures and
institutions included in Carter's anti-constitutional element are country specific. This
relativism means that the radical right is "primarily a concept defined in relation to the
particular version of the democratic constitutional order" in which it exists (Roberts
1994, 467; quoted in Carter 2005, 20). This allows for variation in particular ideologies
of radical right parties, but still links them through a core ideology that is central to each
party. Radical right parties are anti-constitutional and anti-democratic parties based upon
the central ideological concepts of nativism and populism. They necessarily begin with a
socially constructed "us-them" worldview based upon national identities, and tend to
demonize the other. They have a fundamental respect for a strictly ordered society, but
believe the power fundamentally lies with the pure people rather than the corrupted elite.
It is the combination of these ideologies and how they are manifested in particular
contexts (and reinforce or alter these contexts) that set these parties apart from other
political parties and makes them of interest to this study. If these parties were to act upon
their agenda, the resulting policies would be expected to reflect these key ideological
features, which are in sharp contrast to many ideals of liberal democracy, and may be
detrimental to these democratic systems.
1 Since there is considerable debate on the dividing line between the mainstream right and the radical right,
adding Mudde's core ideological components comes into conflict with the parties that make up the
borderline cases in Carter's study, and her last category of radical right party ideologies (Neo-liberal
populist parties). I will note this conflict again when it comes up; however, none of these parties playa
central role in this project.
9POTENTIAL IMPACTS
To situate this project with the existing literature, I will now review some of the
most discussed effects radical right parties are thought to have. These effects are best
thought of as direct effects on public policy, broad social effects, and effects on other
parties and the party system.2 As will be discussed later, this project will concentrate on
effects that travel through other political parties, as the other types seem to be relatively
limited and difficult to ascertain. Their political position on the fringe, as protest parties,
and their relatively limited parliamentary representation, severely limit their chances of
actually governing. The rest of this project thus seeks to explore the impacts of radical
right parties on mainstream political parties (changes in their relative ideological
positioning in particular).
Direct Policy Effects
Perhaps the most straightforward way of determining the effects of a political
party is to look at the policies enacted when that party is in government. One would
expect a party to enact policies that coincide with the issues most important to its
manifesto. In the case of the radical right, this would mean policies that reflect the main
principle of nativism. Examples include more restrictive immigration policies and a
tightening on eligibility of social benefits to exclude nonnatives. Analyzing the impact of
the radical right based upon directly enacted policies is problematic for many reasons.
First ofall, when in government, populist radical right parties are generally junior
2 This framework is adapted from Cas Mudde (2007). His original framework also includes internal effects
on the populist radical right parties themselves, but this category is not as relevant to this project as the
others.
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partners in coalitions at the national level. Even this situation, however, is quite rare.
More often, these parties are in opposition to the parties in government, if represented in
parliament at all.
In addition to rarely being in government to enact policies that reflect their
agenda, parties that do enter coalition governments are sometimes required to sign a
(symbolic) pledge to moderate their agenda. While these documents do not come with
the force of law, they do demonstrate that other parties are not willing to enact radical
policies even if they are open to working in conjunction with radical right for other
reasons. For example, in Romania the PRM and the PUNR agreed to a protocol
"'forbid[ding] any manifestation of racism, anti-Semitism, extremism and totalitarianism"
(Shafir 1996, 91 quoted in Mudde 2007, 181). The FPO in Austria signed a similar
declaration stating that "'The Federal Government reaffIrms its unswerving adherence to
the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of the peoples ofEurope
and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles
which form the basis of all genuine democracy" (Schussel and Haider 2000, quoted in
Mudde 2007, 181). As mentioned earlier, these declarations may largely be a symbolic
act for the mainstream parties to reassure the public (and the world) that they will not
concede to the radical right parties. However this places a very real limitation on the
likelihood of radical right parties enacting policies that reflect their agenda. Even so, the
vague language of the statements also lends itself to the rhetoric of the right, making it an
agreeable proposition for both parties. Take the Austrian example. The FPO could use
the language of this document to rally its supporters by arguing that they are the only
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party that is fit to truly uphold such a pledge since the other parties are corrupt. They
could also suggest that by referring to the "common heritage of the European people", the
OVP is demonstrating that it is heavily influenced by outside forces and is not best suited
to care for the needs of Austrians.
All these difficulties being noted, some trends in immigration policies have been
discussed in reference to populist radical parties. Due to the way that immigration
policies cross cut traditional partisan divides (Tichenor 2002), one would expect
mainstream parties to seek consensual policies. Therefore, radical right parties could
provide an outside impetus that may be responsible for change in immigration policy.
Ted Perlmutter (2002) examines the role the Republikaner played in German asylum
policy and the role Lega Nord played in Italian immigration policy. In both contexts, he
finds that the parties were presented with opportunities to playa pivotal role in shaping
policy reforms, but neither took the lead one might expect. He describes the role of the
REP as a messenger while the LN showed a "less insistent focus and a less consistent
restrictionism on immigration" than expected (Perlmutter 2002, 294-295). In addition to
these examples of radical right parties not playing a leading role in increasingly
restrictive policies, there is a trend toward more restrictive policies across Europe
regardless of the power of the populist radical right in a given country. In fact, the
radical right party family is very weak in the European Parliament and the convergence
of immigration policies within the EU has been lead largely by the leaders of Spain and
Britain, two countries with no real influential radical right parties to speak of (Mudde
2007, 281-282).
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Broad Social Effects
Radical right parties may also have social effects in addition to political effects.
An increase in exposure to xenophobic rhetoric may increase racial tensions, and perhaps
spark an increase in racially motivated violence. On the other hand, the presence of a
radical right party may serve as a legitimate outlet for xenophobia, and thus act as a
mediating factor that reduces racial violence. Theoretically, the xenophobic rhetoric of
the radical right could legitimize feelings of racial inequality and intolerance. Or, it could
lead to a backlash effect of mobilizing opposition and increasing tolerance and
acceptance of nonnatives (Koopmans 1996, for example). There have been some studies
that have suggested that increased levels ofviolence are correlated with support for
radical right parties, but these studies have not demonstrated causality (Eatwell2000;
Mudde 2005, 2007). As with the previous effects, it is difficult to determine whether any
increase in xenophobia is influenced by the radical right parties, or if the same social
factors that led to the rise of these parties also produce the xenophobic tendencies.
OUTLINING THE PROJECT
Following this introductory chapter that defined the boundaries of what is
included in the radical right party family and discussed some potential impacts, the
Chapter II will offer a review of some of effects on mainstream party positions that are
discussed in the academic literature. While this review is by no means exhaustive, I do
believe that it captures the main thrust of the literature and attempts to place it within a
framework. In addition to looking at several potential patterns across party systems, I
also consider the implications of individual party movements. Finally, I will discuss the
13
methods and data used to analyze the effects of the radical right on the positioning of
mainstream political parties.
Chapter III analyzes the relationship between radical right parties and the
movement ofmainstream parties across cases. It begins by looking for broad patterns of
movements among party systems. I present evidence that suggests radical right parties
may cause convergence, as well as divergence, among the mainstream parties. There is
also evidence of radical right parties shifting the party system to the right and to the left.
However, along with the evidence of these patterns, there is also counterevidence that
suggests these movements are not necessarily attributable to the radical right parties.
From here, I look more closely at the movements of individual mainstream right parties
in response to an electorally influential radical right party. I find that the actions of the
mainstream right parties seem to be connected to variations in the ideology of the radical
right party. Mainstream right parties tend to move toward less-extreme radical right
parties and away from more-extreme radical right parties. If the radical right party is
neo-liberal and xenophobic, mainstream right parties tend to co-opt the political space of
the radical right, or compete with the radical right by engaging with it. In contrast, if the
radical right party is authoritarian and xenophobic, mainstream right parties tend to
cordon offthe radical right party or compete with it by differentiating their positions. I
also find that although the differences in ideology are based on different perceptions of
the state, and that both groups are xenophobic at their core, the reactions of the
mainstream parties are manifested most strongly in the issue area most clearly associated
with the radical right, immigration.
----~---------
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In Chapter IV, I contextualize the cross-case framework in order to present
qualitative evidence from a handful of cases. The chapter serves two main purposes.
First, it is designed to examine the validity of the data this project is based upon. The
main source of data used to examine the impact of radical right parties in this paper is
political space diagrams that have been constructed from several expert judgment surveys
conducted since 1982. Since these diagrams involve converting the results of surveys of
individuals' opinions into compatible scales, there is potential for error. The first part of
Chapter IV looks at some of the movements ofpolitical parties in two cases in order to
show that these diagrams do, in fact, seem to match fairly well with the historical changes
in policy positions, philosophies, and strategies. The second purpose of this chapter is to
look at some of the movements seen in these diagrams in slightly more detail. I discuss
movements that are found in two cases, and explore potential ways in which these
movements could be connected to the radical right. I again present qualitative evidence,
this time to demonstrate that the rationale behind some of the party movements visible in
these diagrams is the result of the radical right.
Chapter V is a breif concluding chapter that recaps the main findings of the
project and suggests possible future research. Also included are tables of the raw data
used to construct the political space diagrams (Appendix A), a left/right and an
immigration political space diagram for each country (Appendix B), and a country-by-
country list of party abbreviations (Appendix C).
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a review of the relevant academic literature. It is intended
to situate this project within the existing themes of this literature, and to develop a
theoretical framework for the remainder of the project. I have already defmed the central
characteristics of radical right parties and reviewed a few different types of effects that
the parties may have. Some scholars have suggested that there may be direct policy
effects and potential broad social effects of radical right parties, but these studies have
been relatively inconclusive since the effects are difficult to attribute directly the radical
right parties themselves. Others have pointed to changes in the mainstream parties,
suggesting that even if radical right parties do not have a direct impact on policy or
society, they alter the political system through other parties. This project focuses on
impact that the radical right might have on changes in the positions ofmainstream parties
in political space. This particular chapter lays out potential patterns that we might expect
to find in party systems (convergence, divergence, shifting to the left, and shifting to the
right) as well as discrete movements of individual parties. In addition to describing the
patterns and movements, I also theoretically develop rationales as to why these
movements may be expected to occur, and how the may be connected to radical right
parties. Some potential pathways include altering the political agenda, changing policy
16
priorities, and reframing or redefining existing issue areas. Finally, I will discuss the
data, methodology, and cases that will be used throughout the study.
ORIENTATION OF THIS PROJECT: PARTIES IN SPACE
For all of the reasons mentioned above, not only is it difficult for radical right
parties to have direct policy influence, any influence that one of these parties does have is
difficult to determine. However, the "importance of the populist radical right in
contemporary European politics is probably through their impact on other parties"
(Mudde 2007,282). Elections are zero-sum, so an increased percentage of the vote for a
new party necessarily reduces the percentage of votes for established parties, unless they
are able to mobilize new voters. Therefore, the breakthrough of radical right parties
likely has some effect on the support of mainstream parties. However, the more
important influence these parties can have is on the party system, the political ideologies,
and the manner in which politics is conducted. "The success of a [radical right] party in
one country may make it more likely that a similar party would emerge elsewhere, even
in the absence of the same facilitating conditions present in the first country" (Schain et
al. 2002, 16-17). Through emulating political strategies, direct political assistance, and/or
issue cooptation, other political parties may be affected by the success of a populist
radical right party. Much of this can be seen through the FN in France. Leader Jean-
Marie Le Pen's party has been seen as a model for others to follow and has offered direct
assistance and support for other emerging parties, like the National Front in Belgium.
The party's organization and strategy have also been emulated by the Danish People's
party (Rydgren 2004). In Germany, the CDU/CSU seemingly co-opted immigration and
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law and order policies, but it is difficult to tie this effect directly to the Republikaner.
The CDU/CSU "spread statistics on crime, on the rising numbers of illegal aliens, and on
the exploding costs of immigration and asylum which suggested [... ] that a dramatic
increase ofcrime and violence was the result of foreigners in the country" but they began
stressing the issue before the rise of the REP (Mickenberg 2001, 6). While it is likely
that the CDU/CSU was in some way reacting to the radical right, it is difficult to
detennine the degree to which their actions were shaped by underlying social changes
and the degree to which they were shaped by the competition with the radical right.
THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
The main premise of this project is that radical right parties may indeed have
impacts on party positioning, but that these effects have been difficult to isolate. While I
cannot disprove other possibilities at this time, my central theory is that the effects of
radical right parties tend to flow through the issue that is central to the identity of the
parties. I will later compare party positioning on the central issue area of radical right
parties (immigration) with an overall dimension, and attempt to isolate the impact these
parties have on shaping the political environment. I will treat the party as factor that can
shape the environment within which it exists. The rise in popularity of radical parties on
the fringe ofmainstream parties can alter potential coalition partners, and thus the overall
party structure (Bale 2003), and the actions taken by the parties can influence this
process. By viewing and presenting political issues through the lens of identity, these
parties have been able to politicize the items most closely attached to their core ideology.
This can occur through the use of rhetoric and images that reflect an "us-them"
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worldview. While populist radical right parties generally concentrate on issues central to
their agenda, these political strategies are reflected in much of their propaganda,
regardless of the issue, which in turn can increase the salience of their core issues. The
focus on issues of identity can disrupt previously coalescent elite behavior, homogeneous
societal opinions, and/or entrenched party positions on immigration and other areas.
It is possible that the increased influence ofa party on the radical right could
cause shifts in the positions of mainstream parties. The debate over immigration
contested by the populist radical right (as well as other issues) may shift to the right,
become more polarized, become condensed, or shift to the left as a reaction. Parties may
change their political strategies in an attempt to either limit the influence of the radical
right or reassure their own position. They may treat the radical party as a pariah, attempt
to co-opt issues, attempt to appease the party, or see the party as a potential coalition
partner. The choice of strategies will likely vary on the particular context, current
political environment (both domestic and international), and the relative extremeness of
the ideology of the radical right party. These strategies can alter the effects of the radical
right party, as well as have an effect on the party (Mudde 2007,287-290). Evidence of
such processes will necessarily require contextualization in order to render it meaningfuL
Due to time, resource, and language constraints, I will not be able to get into each case in
as much detail as I would like, but I will be able to use this information to illustrate the
types of relationships that exist in order to connect the cross-case comparisons more
directly to the actions of the parties.
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Converging and Diverging Parties
Two main theoretically expected effects of radical right parties are convergence
and divergence of the political space. Some scholars have argued that a radical right
party could lead toward a homogenization (convergence) or a polarization (divergence)
of the mainstream political parties. Some of these expectations are derived from analyses
of the circumstances that can allow for the opportunity of a radical right party to have an
electoral breakthrough. Yet I have tried to structure them in a way that looks for what
one might expect to see in terms ofparty movement influenced by the electoral success
of a radical right party. Given the segmented nature of the available data, it will be
difficult to isolate these factors temporally to determine the direction of the causal arrow.
Therefore, these are some of the theoretically expected movements that I will be looking
for in conjunction with electorally influential radical right parties.
From a Downsian (Downs 1957) perspective, Hainsworth (1992) and Kitschelt
and McGann (1995) have argued that electorally successful radical right parties will be
accompanied by a convergence among the mainstream parties. The most "favorable
terrain for the extreme right has often been situations where the ideological distance
between the major parties was reduced, thereby creating a vacuum on the right
conductive to extreme right success" (Hainsworth 1992). In addition, when there is
substantial convergence between the mainstream parties, political "entrepreneurs should
be able to broaden their electorate beyond the right-authoritarian core through populist
anti-statist messages and actually build a very strong 'cross-class' alliance against the
established parties" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995,53). Elisabeth Carter has tested this
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premise statistically over time and space and found that, as expected, convergence
between the mainstream right and mainstream left is associated with higher electoral
results for radical right parties (Carter 2005, 136-141). This project is looking at the
effects of radical right parties, so the causal arrow would be reversed in these scenarios,
but there would be the same expected correlation between party movement and electoral
success, except with a distinct time lag that may be visible. In addition, there are
theoretical reasons to expect that a radical right party may. in fact, cause convergence
among the mainstream parties. It has been demonstrated that the electoral success of the
FN in France has led to an effort to build consensus around an explicitly centrist
approach to immigration in an attempt to isolate the radical right party (Schain 2002).
Tim Bale (2003) has taken Peter Mair's (2001) analysis of the rise and
normalization of the Greens and applied it to the radical right. Mair argued that the most
significant result of the electoral success and acceptance of the Green party family was to
boost the fortunes of left party blocs across Europe. The parties had become thought of
as mainstream and as potential coalition partners, which resulted in an increase in left
bloc governing coalitions (Mair 2001). Bale, in turn, argues that a similar phenomenon
can be seen with the right party bloc and the rise of the radical right parties. These
coexistent trends have led to competition among bipolar blocs ofparties. The resulting
pattern would be a polarization of the political space. This could appear as convergence
within the right and left (solidifying the party blocs) and/or overall divergence ofthe
political space.
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Directional Shifts
In addition to accepting radical right parties as potential coalition partners,
mainstream right parties have picked up some of the themes of the radical right (Bale
2003). Incorporating the core themes of the radical right would show up as a shift toward
the right in the political space. By interpreting Bale's argument into the framework of
my data, I would expect to find that in addition to polarization, radical right parties would
cause a shift to the right by the mainstream right parties. In a similar vein, Minkenberg
(200 I) has linked the perceived turn to the right in European politics as an attempt by
mainstream parties to compete with the radical right and Schain (2006) has argued that
there are direct and indirect connections between radical right parties and more
restrictionist immigration policies. Each of these is suggesting that radical right parties
are causing mainstream parties to shift their positions to the right. Such a movement
should be observable in the overall political space, and be more pronounced in on the
issue of immigration if, in fact, they are directly related to the radical right.
It is also well established that the VB in Belgium has enjoyed continued electoral
success in conjunction with a cordon sanitaire by the mainstream parties. The
mainstream left and right have made an agreement to refuse to work with the radical right
party. By doing so, it is reasonable to expect that the mainstream parties would clearly
distinguish their policy positions from those of the radical right. This would appear as a
shift to the left in the political space. While shifting to the left may be a counterintuitive
impact of a radical right party in some sense, it is plausible (and empirically supported)
that in some instances an electorally successful radical right party could produce such a
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movement. One might expect that the reactions of mainstream parties may be "structured
by ideas about the legitimacy of right-wing populist movements and perceptions of the
threat they pose to the quality of democracy" and, in particular the manner in which a
nation has dealt with the legacy ofNazism and World War II (Art 2006,8-9).
As discussed above, there are several patterns that we might expect to find when
looking for impacts of radical right parties on party positioning. In the following chapter,
I will be looking for patterns of convergence and divergence, as well as directional shifts
and analyzing any potential connects to radical right parties.
Smaller Alternatives: Individual Strategies
David Art (2006) has contended that mainstream parties are likely to refuse to
work with radical right parties while at the same time take up the issues and policy
positions raised by the radical right parties into their own agenda. "Established political
parties seize on the themes of right-wing populist parties [... ] while simultaneously
denouncing them as enemies of the system [... ] and refusing to cooperate with them, or
even speak with them, on any political level" (Art 2006, 8). In this sense, each of these
movements may better be examined as a choice confronted by individual parties. Art
suggests that existing political parties can choose to either cooperate with the radical right
in an attempt to "tame" them and integrate them into the political system, or to combat
the radical right by undermining its electoral appeal by "denying the far right any hope of
participating in coalitions or passing its own legislation" (Art 2006, 8). There are
variations of each of these strategies, but an important take away point is that these are
choices made by the established parties - choices made by each individual established
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party. For this reason, in addition to looking for patterns of impacts on party systems, I
will also look more closely at actions taken by individual parties when confronted with an
electorally successful radical right party.
METHODOLOGY
This project will consist of two interrelated parts - a cross-case comparison and a
close examination of a small number of cases. The comparative portion will be intended
to establish the existence of potential relationships and the case studies will be allow for
the examination of the mechanisms through which these relationships flow. According to
conventional cross-case logic of inquiry, comparing a few cases or analyzing independent
case studies may not allow for broad generalizations to be confidently made; however,
"case studies do provide an ideal - perhaps the best - soil for conceiving of
generalizations" (Sartori 1991,249). Although some have suggested that a researcher
ought to increase the number of cases whenever possible (King et al. 1994), many others
have suggested that analyzing a single case can serve a valuable purpose within the social
sciences. Some have created a place for case studies as theory testing or theory
generating exercises in part of a larger research project (van Evera 1997) while a growing
body of qualitative methodologists are creating a distinct causal logic for case studies
based upon within case evidence rather than cross-case evidence (Brady and Collier
2004; Gerring 2007, for example). This project seeks to be acceptable to both camps.
First, I will compare variation across time and space in order to demonstrate the presence
of a relationship. Then I examine a handful of cases in order look for evidence that can
fill in the gaps between the parties and the outcomes. Due to the relatively small number
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of cases, and large number of influential factors being considered, I will not run rigorous
statistical analyses. Instead, I will parse the data into individual countries, and analyze
the changes in party positions over time in conjunction with election data and qualitative
evidence.
Political Space Diagrams Created from Expert Judgment Surveys
Following the work of Elisabeth Carter (2005) and Sarah de Lange (2008), the
main analysis of this project is based on several expert judgment surveys conducted
between 1982 and 2006. I will use these surveys to plot party positions on a two
dimensional left/right scale, and track the changes in these party positions over time. I
have constructed political space diagrams for several Western European nations with this
data that shows how parties have altered their positions over time. I will also analyze
similar diagrams constructed from these surveys for the issue of immigration. These
diagrams are made up of five comprehensive studies: Castles and Mair (1984)-
questionnaires sent out in 1982, Laver and Hunt (1992) - questionnaires sent out in 1989,
Huber and Inglehart (1995) - questionnaires sent out in 1993, Lubbers (2000) -
questionnaires sent out in 2000, and Benoit and Laver (2006) - questionnaires sent out
between 2002 and 2004. When available, I have also included the results from country
specific surveys: Laver (1995) on the Netherlands - questionnaires sent out in 1994,
Laver (1998) on Britain - questionnaires sent out in 1997, Laver and Mair (1999) on the
Netherlands - questionnaires sent out in 1998, and Ray and Narud (2000) on Norway-
questionnaires sent out in 1998. The diagrams depicting the political space surrounding
immigration are based upon two of these surveys that asked respondents to place parties
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on several issue areas, including immigration: Lubbers (2000) and Benoit and Laver
(2006). I was able to construct an additional data point from the Lubbers survey from a
question that asked the experts to place the parties on the same scale in 1990.3
There were several initial problems that had to be overcome in order to use these
surveys. First of all, some of the studies asked respondents to place the parties on an
overall left/right scale, but others (Laver and Hunt and the two country level surveys by
Laver) included only issue areas, not a generic political space scale. In these instances,
the overall political space was constructed using the most salient issues of socio-
economic and social policy (Carter 2005; de Lange 2008).4 In addition, each survey used
a different numerical scale to represent the political space. These differences had to be
normalized into a consistent scale that could be used across each survey. I have chosen
to use a 0-100 scale with 0 being the extreme-left and 100 being the extreme-right.
I cannot take complete credit for the idea of transforming these surveys into
political space diagrams. Elisabeth Carter (2005) used these surveys to create similar
diagrams in order to investigate the political opportunities that were most likely to lead to
the electoral success of radical right parties. I am following the lead of these scholars by
making use of the same surveys, but I have added to their work in several ways. First, I
have updated Carter's work to include a later survey (Benoit and Laver 2006), as Sarah
de Lange (2008) did to use them to evaluate instances of radical right parties being
3 This is an imperfect measure of party positions in 1990, since it is based upon expert perceptions in 2000,
but it does allow for some sense of how parties have altered their positions over the previous 10 years.
4 The same process was used to create the French overall left/right scale from the Benoit and Laver (2006)
survey because they did not ask respondents to place the parties on a generic left/right dimension in France,
even though this was included in each of the other countries.
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involved in governing coalitions. I have also increased the number of cases whenever
possible. Further, I have created similar diagrams ofthe political space surrounding
immigration from the available data.
If a clear picture of these political space diagrams has not been created via this
description, they will become clear in the following chapter when I discuss several of
them in context. In addition to these diagrams, I also use election results and qualitative
evidence to look at them in another way. Rather that looking at them as showing an
opportunity that could lead to the emergence of a radical right party, I look at them as
potentially showing instances in which radical right parties may have altered party
positioning within this political space.
A Key Initial Dermition
At this time, I feel that it is necessary to define some terms that I will be using
throughout much of this project. When looking at the potential impact of radical right
parties on party position, it became evident early on that a decision needed to be made
regarding some sort ofcutoff for which radical right parties would be included, and
which would not. Because I am looking at party position in addition to election results, I
have decided to make this decision based upon electoral success. My initial inclination
was to consider all radical right parties that have been elected into national parliaments as
electorally successful, and including them as a group. However, electoral rules vary
across cases. In other words, the same electoral results (as a percentage) could get a party
represented in parliament in one country, but not another. For this reason, I decided to
use Germany's electoral threshold of 5% as my definition of a radical right party being
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electorally influential. In the interest of styIe and prose, I will at times also use the term
electorally relevant. This is merely a stylistic choice, and in this study, these terms are
synonymous and can be used interchangeably.
I do not argue that electoral relevance is required for a radical right party to have
an impact on politics, or even on party positioning in political space. I did, however,
need to make a choice that would define my case selection, and this 5% seemed to be the
most reasonable. It can be universal across the cases, and earning this portion of the vote
in a national election would lead to the party being represented in parliament in each
case. In addition, in some cases, it also differentiates the party from other small parties
that receive a minor number of votes, and have a representative or two in parliament. A
5% threshold for electoral influence means that that party has substantial support in the
electorate, and can potentially be seen as a difference making coalition partner by
mainstream parties.
CASE SELECTION
In expanding the data set, I attempted to include as many countries in Western
Europe as was reasonable. I was able to obtain data (though not from every survey for
each case) for Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. I have excluded
Greece and Italy from most of the analysis out of necessity because of the complex and
inconsistent nature of the political parties and available data. This leaves 12 main cases,
half of which have had at least one electorally influential party, as I have defined it (FPC>
in Austria, VB and FNb in Belgium, DF and FRP(d) in Denmark, FN in France, FRP(n)
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in Norway, and ND in Sweden). Most ofthe analysis is drawn across comparisons based
on all 12 cases, but some final conclusions are made from comparisons within this subset
of cases that have had an electorally influential radical right party.
CONCLUSION
This chapter is intended to situate this project within an existing body of literature
on the effects that radical right parties may have on political systems. I have shown that
while the effects that have been discussed have been difficult to directly connect to the
radical right, it is likely that effects travel through, and are most closely tied to,
interactions with mainstream political parties. The following chapters are an
investigation into these effects on mainstream parties. I will first compare across cases to
identify distinguishable patterns of movement of political systems, and then examine
movements of individual political parties. I will look for the patterns of convergence
between the mainstream right and the mainstream left, convergence within each group,
divergence or polarization of the party system, and directional shifts to the left or to the
right that are suggested in the literature. Following this broad analysis ofpolitical space,
I will look more closely the movements of individual parties since the patterns could
essentially be the result ofpotentially unrelated strategic choices made by each party
when confronted with an electorally influential radical right party.
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CHAPTER III
COMPARING ACROSS CASES
INTRODUCTION
Upon an initial glance across Western Europe, it may seem that there is not a
single clearly distinguishable effect that radical right parties have on the changes in
position of other political parties. However, a closer examination does yield some
significant trends, and provides plenty of evidence in support of the theoretical elements
laid out in the previous chapter. Along with this evidence comes much counter evidence
that, when coupled with a relatively small number of cases and a relatively large number
of influential factors, makes it difficult to substantiate or deny any of these theories
completely. One trend that does stand up well to scrutiny is related to the ideological
make-up ofthe radical right parties. Large and secondary mainstream right parties are
more likely to shift their position toward (by competing by engaging with andlor co-
opting the space of) a less-extreme radical right party, while they are more likely to shift
their position away from (by competing by differentiating from and/or cordoning off) a
more-extreme radical right party. This chapter will proceed by first engaging in an
analysis of some patterns that one might expect to see emerge as a result of the electoral
influence of a radical right party. I will also provide counter evidence when available. It
will look more closely at the actions of individual parties, and by examining the role that
variation in party ideology plays, I conclude that this is the most influential factor in
---------------------------- .
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determining how mainstream parties will respond to a radical right party. Further, these
differences are accentuated on the issue area most closely associated with the radical
right, immigration, even though the both groups of radical right parties are similarly
xenophobic.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF POTENTIAL PATTERNS
In this section, I will provide empirical evidence that supports each of the
theoretical possibilities outlined in the previous chapter, and, when available, I will also
provide counter evidence that seems to contradict the expectation. Since radical right
parties are not ideologically homogeneous, and they tend to be more similar on social
issues (especially immigration) rather than economic issues (Rovny 2009), I make use of
the expert studies that specifically address immigration as a check on the impact of the
radical right While it is not necessary for the influence of radical right parties to travel
through the issue of immigration, if the same or exaggerated patterns appear, it would
provide additional support to the idea that these movements could be connected to the
radical right. Conversely, if similar patterns are not seen on the issue of immigration, it
could mean that the overall movements on the left/right dimension may be due to other
factors.
I will first discuss the patterns that could emerge on the party system and party
family level. There is some support for each of these possibilities; however, there is also
evidence that seems to contradict each outcome being directly linked to radical right
parties. Following this discussion, I will then move onto a more promising discussion of
the movements of individual parties. Please note that, in this chapter, the assertions of
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party movements are mainly based upon interpretations of the expert judgment surveys
and election results. These are generally uncontrolled correlations, so the movements and
their connections to the radical right could be one explanation, but I am not able to
control for every other possibility. I will provide some contextual evidence here, and
develop this discussion further in the following chapter to suggest that in some cases it
does seem as though there is a real connection between these factors.
As mentioned earlier, when looking at the party system and party families, the
patterns that one might expect to see are convergence, divergence, a trend to the left, or a
trend to the right. Each of these might be visible among the party system as a whole, or
in individual party families (i.e. among "the left" or "the right").
Convergence and Divergence
In this section, I will attempt to show that there is empirical evidence behind
claims of both convergence and divergence among party systems. There is evidence that
suggests that radical right parties could cause a convergence ofparty systems and party
families, however there are also cases of these same types of convergence evident in
countries without an electorally influential radical right party. There is also evidence
supporting the idea ofdivergence in party systems and party families. Unlike with the
convergence thesis, there are not instances of strong divergence in countries without an
electorally influential radical right party. For this reason, I cannot disconfirm a
polarization of the party system as one possible effect of radical right parties.
Let me first start with the idea ofconvergence. One could argue that a radical
right party could cause a convergence among the mainstream parties toward the political
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center. Such an argument would suggest that in order to disassociate and distance their
own stance from that of the radical right party, the mainstream party would adjust their
positions and appear to be more moderate. Although this seems to more closely apply to
parties ofthe mainstream right (as their positions are perceived as the closest to the
radical right and therefore most likely in need of differentiation), such a movement could
quickly elicit a similar movement from the mainstream left. In order to avoid losing
votes to a moderating party of the right, a left party would then also move toward the
center and appeal to median voters. It is also possible that the mainstream parties could
explicitly seek a centrist, consensus building position in an attempt to isolate the radical
right party (Schain 2002). The same basic formula can also be seen within party families.
Parties of the right could be converging toward a center-right position while parties of the
left are converging toward a center-left position.
Looking at the political space, it is easy to fmd evidence ofconvergence. In
France, for example, there appears to be a clear trend, albeit slight, of convergence both
within the right and the left, as well as between the right and the left. As illustrated in
Figure 1, aside from a brief period between 1989 and 1993, the PCF and the PS have
been moving toward each other, as have the UDF and the RPR. At the same time, the
distance between the parties of the right and the parties of the left is decreasing. A
similar pattern plays out in Figure 2 when looking at the issue of immigration. There is
both convergence within the right and the left, as well as convergence between the right
and the left. The FN in France is often considered the prototypical radical right party,
and has been electorally influential since 1986. It would not be completely unfounded to
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suggest that the convergence seen here may be linked to the presence of a powerful
radical right party. However, one cannot make a generalization about all radical right
parties from this information alone.
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Figure 2: France Immigration Political Space Diagram
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Figure 3 shows that, like in France, there is convergence going on in Germany as
well. However, there is not an electorally influential radical right parly in Germany.
Although Germany does have a radical right presence, and there has been radical right
representation in state parliaments, no radical right party (not the DVU, the NPD, nor the
Republikaner) has passed the 5% threshold in a federal election to be represented
Bundestag. Therefore, the national level convergence within the right and the left and the
convergence beMeen the right and the left visible in Figure 3, cannot be accounted for
through the presence of an electorally influential radical right party. In other words, in
some instances (perhaps in France), a radical right party could have a moderating effect
on a party system, causing the parties to converge; the strong presence of a radical right
party is not a necessary condition for this outcome.
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Figure 3: Germany Left/Right Political Space Diagram
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Now that I have shown that an electorally influential radical right party is not
necessary for a convergence of political parties, I will examine divergence.
Theoretically, the rise of a radical right party could cause other parties to diverge their
positions from one another, resulting in a polarization. Similar to convergence, this could
occur within the left and/or the right, or between the left and the right. Such a result
could follow from parties taking different strategies for dealing with the new challenger.
If some parties moderate their position, in an attempt to seem more legitimate, and other
parties adopt positions further to the right in order to avoid losing voters to the radical
right party, or if they see the new party as a potential coalition partner, the resulting
pattern could be one of divergence, or polarization.
Figure 4 shows the political space ofNorway, where the FRP(n) has had strong
election results and has been represented in the national parliament since 1989. While
there has been significant convergence between the center party (SP) and the main
Labour Party (DNA), there has also been significant divergence within the right. Since
1989, the same year as the electoral breakthrough of the FRP(n), the main party of the
right, H0)'re, has generally been moving further to the right, while the secondary right
party, KRF, has been moving to the left, aligning closer to the centrists and labour. From
this information, it would appear that these two mainstream right parties have taken
different strategies to dealing with the challenge from the radical right. The KRF has
decided to moderate and become more of a centrist party, while H0)'re has decided to
challenge the FRP(n) directly for that political space. The result is a polarization of the
right, with the FRP(n) and H0)'re on one side, and the KRF on the other.
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However, attributing this polarizing effect solely to the electoral influence ofthe
FRP(n) might be unfounded. Figure 5 shows the party positions on the issue of
immigration. Not only is there a very clear separation from the mainstream parties'
positions and the position of the radical right, it is also clear that the mainstream parties'
positions are relatively close to one another, and they are aU trending in the same
direction, to the left. If the polarization of the right visible in Figure 4 was a direct result
of the radical right, one would expect to see a similar, and possibly more drastic,
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divergence on immigration. Since this is not the case, the overall party positions may
partly be attributable to the FRP(n), but are likely the result of other factors.
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Figure 5: Norway Immigration Political Space Diagram
There are no instances of strong polarization within or between left and the right
in a country without an electorally influential radical right party. There is some slight
divergence in regard to immigration in Spain (see Appendix B for diagram), but not in
the party syst m as a whole. Due to the lack of a counter-example, I am unable to
disconfirm an argument that suggests polarization of the party system is caused by the
electoral success of a radical right party.
Shifting to the Right and Shifting to the Left
Another possible impact that a radical right party could have is the shifting of the
entire political system to the right or to the left. One might expect either possibility to be
relatively equally plausible. \Vhen confronted with an increasingly popular radical right
challenger, mainstream parties could adjust their own positions to the left in order to
distance themselves from the radical right if they view these positions as dangerous or
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illegitimate. Conversely, one could also expect mainstream parties to move to the right in
an attempt to (re)capture any voters that may be considering voting for the radical right.
In this section, I will examine a few instances in which there is evidence ofparties'
overall positions and positions on immigration shifting to the left and shifting to the right
that may be caused by a radical right party.
The electoral success of the FPO in Austria is well documented. It has been
represented in the national parliament since its founding in 1956 and has several stints as
the junior partner in coalition governments. One might expect to find pronounced effects
in such a case. Figure 6 shows the general political space in Austria. The first thing to
note is that the FPO itself made a large shift to the right between 1989 and 1993 (shortly
after Jorg Haider assumed the leadership role in 1986). More important, in this context,
is the movement of the OVP and the SPO. Both parties have made gradual but
substantial moves to the right over the period of time, visible in the diagram. This is
consistent with the expectation that mainstream parties will shift their positions toward an
increasingly popular challenger in order to (re)capture lost votes. It is also consistent
with a radical right party having an impact on the rhetoric of political discussions and the
framing of issues. Such an impact is subtler, but over time could cause a similar gradual
repositioning of the parties.
Figure 7 shows that this same basic pattern holds in Austria on the issue of
immigration. The drift to the right is less pronounced, and the SPO corrects back to the
left (but not to their original position). While this does not represent the strongest
evidence linking the shifts to the FPO, this does not suggest that the impacts are not
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connected to the radical right party. An exaggerated version of the overall relationship
would provide additional evidence linking the impacts to the electorally influential
radical right party, and a contradictory pattern would suggest that the two are not directly
related. Neither exists in this case. In this instance, the changes in positions on
immigration do not contradict the previous evidence, nor do they add substantial weight
of their own.
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The issue of immigration in Denmark provides a more visible example of the
radical right shifting party positions to the right. In Figuxe 8, the main and secondary
parties of the right both shift substantially to the right. The same is even more true for
the main party of the left, and there is some movement of the smaller parties of the left,
but not universal. However, this movement is limited to the issue of immigration. A
similar pattern does not translate to overall party position; as can be seen in Appendix B,
overall party positions are fairly consistent over time.
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Figure 8: Denmark Immigration Political Space Diagram
In this instance, it is most likely that the radical right has changed how the
political debate sun'ounding immigration is framed. The lack of overall movement
suggests that the radical right has not reshaped the political system, and the relative
distance between the radical right patty and the mainstream right parties makes it
unlikely that the movement to the right on immigration was an adjustment in position to
reclaim lost (or avoid losing) votes to the radical right. This would be more likely if the
parties' original positions were closer together. A movement as drastic as that in this
case, by nearly all relevant parties on the issue of immigration, is consistent with the
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radical right parties reframing the immigration debate into more xenophobic terms and
rhetoric, but having little impact on other issue areas. In addition to radical right parties
shifting the party system and the debate surrounding immigration to the right, it is also
possible for these parties to shift party systems and immigration debates to the left.
Although this is theoretically possible, there are not cases in which there has been a
substantial shift of the party system to the left. However, Figure 9 shows that, in
Belgium, mainstream parties' positions on immigration have showed significant
movement to the left. The main parties on the left and on the right, as well as the largest
secondary parties of the left and the right, have all shifted their positions to the left over
the course of the available data. Some parties initially show slight adjustments to the
right, but in the subsequent years these movements are overshadowed by larger
movements to the left, resulting in a nearly universal pattern of each party's position in
2006 being further to the left than it was in 1990. This pattern of shifting to the left on
immigration, but not overall, suggests that most policy positions are relatively unaffected
by the radical right parties, and that by refusing to engage in the xenophobic tone of the
radical right parties in the immigration debate the mainstream parties have clarified and
distinguished their own positions relative to those of the VB and the FNb.
A similar pattern can be seen in Figure 2 below, depicting the political space of
party positions on immigration in France, although it is limited to the UDF and the RPR
(and subsequently UMP). Both mainstream right parties show substantial movement
away from the radical right FN, and toward a more centrist position on immigration.
Similar to the Belgian example, this push to the left seems limited to immigration.
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Neither the RPR nor the UDF saw a similar movement to the left on the overall left/right
scale (see Figure 1 of this chapter, or Appendix B). This again suggests that the FN has
had little effect on the majority of their policy positions, and that the mainstream parties
have differentiated their positions on immigration relative to the FN.
80 100
t-:-==:;..;.....,as-=-RL=:.:;/M~R:.::.-_---:.V.::=B Nb
20
,
,
,
,
,
,
..J".,-__• +---""fI&-----l~ ---jl---------
-1--- -.------1..-----
+--- -.--.--.....;:.~,.....;:;; -----'--
o
1990
2000
2006
Figure 9: Belgium Immigration Political Space Diagram
1990
2000
2006
o 20
peF PS
I
40 60
UDF
80
RPR
100
FN
Figure 2: France Immigration Political Space Diagram
All of the examples of party systems and immigration debates shifting to the right
or to the left that I have discussed thus far have been from countries with at least one
electorally influential radical right party. It is important to note that similar patterns can
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be seen in countries without an electorally significant radical right party. This may be
due to the fact that having an electorally significant radical right party is an imperfect
proxy for really testing the influence of the radical right. There has been a gradual
drifting to the right on immigration and overall in the Netherlands, on immigration in
Portugal, and a sharp shift to the right on immigration and overall in Switzerland (see
Appendix B). The existence of these counterexamples does not, in itself, render the
connection of the previously discussed movements to radical right parties unfounded
however. For example, the Netherlands has had an influential anti-immigration politician
and party (Pim Fortuyn), though it was short lived and often not considered as radical
right, and the mainstream right has seized many themes of the radical right in
Switzerland, and in some ways may be fulfilling the same role. Without the strong
electoral presence of a radical right party, mainstream parties could see an opportunity to
gain votes by capturing the sentiment seen in other countries. It also may not be
necessary for a radical right party to be electorally successful to have the kinds of effects
I am discussing here. The use of xenophobic rhetoric and images in party propaganda
can alter public opinion, the framing of the debate, and spur reactions from mainstream
parties regardless of the electoral success of the radical right party, and these effects
could easily travel across national boarders. This mechanism is particularly important
with regard to the Swiss case, which will become more evident when the political space
diagrams are put into some context in the following chapter.
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LOOKING MORE CLOSELY: THE ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL PARTIES
The preceding section looked at patterns of movements across the party system as
well as within party families. In this section, I will more closely examine the movements
of individual parties during, and shortly following, successful electoral campaigns of
radical right parties. In theory, these movements are the same movements that would
combine to make up the patterns considered earlier, but the lack of a discernable
explanation to the patterns led me to look at the actions of individual parties more
closely. Upon reflection, any pattern may merely be coincidental or circumstantial, and
not directly related to the radical right party at all since parties could determine their
strategy of dealing with the radical right more or less independently. In this context, I
will look more directly at more discrete actions taken by individual mainstream and
secondary parties of the right in countries with an electorally influential radical right
party during the time period of that electoral success. By allowing the ideology of the
radical right party to make a difference in how other parties respond, I am able to
conclude that more-extreme radical right parties tend to produce movements away from
the right, while less-extreme radical right parties tend to produce movements toward the
right.
Defining Some New Terms: Establishing Ideological Diversity
Before laying out the particulars of this argument, and the findings it produces, it
is necessary for me to first define a few new terms that are introduced. All other terms
are used in the same manner as they have been throughout the project. Even after having
settled on a definition of the radical right parties I am discussing, this does not mean that
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this is a completely homogeneous group. Not only is there diversity among radical right
parties on economic issues (Rovny 2009), but there are also differences in the relative
importance placed on the issue of immigration, racist attitudes, and attitudes toward
democracy (Carter 2005, 13-63). Elisabeth Carter (2005) has created a typology in which
she places radical right parties into five distinct categories. In addition to naming these
categories by their ideological components, she also numbers them from 1 to 5 implying
a morelless extreme nature to the categorization. This is indeed true with type one being
neo-Nazi parties, type two being neo-fascist parties, type three being authoritarian
xenophobic parties, type four being neo-liberal xenophobic parties, and type five being
neo-liberal populist parties. These categories are based upon each party's attitudes
toward the three dimensions mentioned above - importance placed on immigration,
racism, and democracy.
According to Carter, neo-Nazi parties are radically xenophobic, adhere to
classical racism, and completely reject the existing democratic system. In this category
are the British National Party and the National Front in Britain, as well as the Deutsche
Volksunion (DVU) and the National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany. Neo-fascist
parties, the second type, are not xenophobic or racist, but outright reject the existing
democratic system.5 This type of radical right party is mainly found in Italy and Spain,
including AN, Ms-Ft, FEA, and FElons. The third group, authoritarian xenophobic
parties, is radically xenophobic, culturist, and demand reform of the existing democratic
5 The lack of xenophobia in this group makes it difficult to place these parties within my definition of
radical right parties, but these parties do not playa large role in this data analysis and I have found no
substantial effect of their inclusion or exclusion.
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system by having less democracy and pluralism, and a greater role for the state. This
group includes Austria's FPC>, Belgium's VB and FNb, France's FN, Germany's
Republikaner, and Switzerland's SD. The fourth category is neo-liberal xenophobic
parties. These parties are radically xenophobic, culturist, and demand more democratic
reforms and a more limited role of the state. Carter includes in this group parties such as
the DF and FRP(d) (since the mid-1980s) in Denmark, LN (since the mid-1990s) in Italy,
FLP and FRP(n) (since the mid 1980s) in Norway, ND and SDk in Sweden, and FPS in
Switzerland. The fifth and final category is neo-liberal populist parties, which are not
xenophobic or racist, and demand more democratic reforms and a more limited role of
the state.6 This type includes the FRP(d) (before the mid 1980s) in Denmark, EK in
Greece, LN (before the mid 1990s) in Italy, FRP(n) (before the mid 1980s) in Norway,
and LdT in Switzerland.
In the following analysis, I have generally adopted the same categorization of
radical right parties, but concentrate on categories three and four. I use the terms more-
extreme and less-extreme to refer to parties' relative position to one another (with the
most-extreme radical right parties being Neo-Nazi parties, type 1, and the least-extreme
radical right parties being neo-liberal populist parties, type 5). Implementing this
typology presents two main challenges to this project. First, adopting a terminology of
more-extreme and less-extreme might lead one to expect that these differences would be
6 Carter notes that the "fact that neo-liberal populist parties embrace neither xenophobic nor racist attitudes,
and the fact that they have rather liberal views on democracy and individual rights, clearly raise questions
over whether these parties should be considered party of the wider extreme [radical] right party family", but
finds that these parties include enough anti-system tendencies to be included (Carter 2005,53) This
category is at odds with Mudde's core ideology of the radical right, and therefore with the definition of
radical right parties used in this project. However, none of these debated borderline cases playa substantial
role in this study.
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reflected in the political space diagrams, when in fact they are not. Secondly, these
categories are closely correlated with the electoral success of radical right parties, which
presents a problem of equifmality. With this information alone, it is difficult to
determine if any effects are the result of the ideology of the radical right party, or a result
of the presence of an electorally successful radical right party. There are two potential
causes for each given outcome.
While it may be disappointing that these categories do not show up in the political
space diagrams, this is not entirely surprising nor does it discount any potential findings
based upon party ideology. First, even though these diagrams are based upon expert's
perceptions of party positions, these experts are still somewhat subject to normal theories
of behavior. Whether one thinks of party position spatially (Downs 1957) or
directionally (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) it is not unexpected that there would be a
condensed scale at the extremes of the spectrum. In addition, each diagram of political
space is bound within a single country. In each context, radical right parties are placed at
the far right end of the political space. Generally speaking they are the farthest party to
the right. Since I am looking at relative positions within each case, and changes in
positions over time, the fact that these diagrams do not capture subtle differences in
ideology does not present a problem for this project.
The equifinality problem is more difficult to simply explain away. However, the
most electorally successful radical right parties are from categories three and four
(authoritarian xenophobic parties and neo-liberal xenophobic parties), and the following
analysis will be comprised of only these two categories. Therefore, both groups under
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consideration have roughly the same levels of electoral success. This does allow for
differentiation between the impact of ideology and electoral success. Although it does
not allow for analysis of the full ideological spectrum of radical right parties, it does
allow for an analysis of an incremental difference between more-extreme radical right
parties and less-extreme radical right parties, at least between these two categories. I
have attempted to differentiate the effects of particular ideologies from the effects of
electoral success with cross-case comparisons as well as within case variation whenever
possible. I will also fill in some of these gaps with contextual evidence in the following
chapter.
Exploring the Possibilities
As we have seen in the previous analysis, each party can respond in a number of
ways when confronted with political challenge.7 The first option would be to do nothing,
and maintain their current positions. In a two dimensional context, aside from remaining
unchanged, existing parties could either move to the right, or to the left. Since the
challenges I will be discussing are presented in the form of radical right political parties,
movement to the right can also be classified as movement toward the radical right party,
while movement to the left can be considered movement away from the radical right
party. It is important to note, though, that all movements in these respective directions
are not equal. A drastic movement in one direction or the other is different than a slight
7 I have intentionally avoided putting a numerical threshold on any of these movements in an attempt to
view the movements holistically within their particular special contexts. Although most movements are
easily distinguishable, there is room for debate at the margins. In these instances, I analyzed other
information, such as time elapsed, proximity to the radical right party, electoral data, historical trends, and
qualitative data, to determine the best categorization of the movement.
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movement. These movements are distinguishable from one another, and can be
interpreted as separate strategies. I am defining a drastic move away from the radical
right as an attempt to cordon off the challenger. Such a move can be seen as an attempt
to delegitimize the position of the radical right party, by clearly distancing one's own
position. A slight movement away from the radical right is being characterized as
competing with the radical right by differentiating. In such a scenario, the mainstream
party is not attempting to delegitimize the radical right, but rather acknowledging their
existence in the system, as well as their claim to their political position. Consequently,
they adjust their own position slightly to compete with a legitimate opponent, but at the
same time differentiate their own position. Like movement away from the radical right,
movement toward the radical right can be either drastic or slight. I will characterize a
slight movement toward the right as competing with the radical right by engaging. In this
instance, the mainstream party is acknowledging the existence of the radical right and the
issues it raises. Through this competition, their positions become closer to the radical
right, and they could show a willingness to work and perhaps compromise with the
radical right party. In such an instance, the mainstream party is engaging in a debate with
the radical right and may adopt a portion of their rhetoric. A drastic movement toward
the radical right can be seen as an attempt to co-opt that political space, those voters,
and/or core issues. Such a movement demonstrates an acknowledgement of the
legitimacy ofthe issues raised by radical right parties, but not necessarily the legitimacy
of the party itself or its ownership of the issue(s) or claim to that political space. In this
instance, the mainstream party could be attempting to either take ownership of the issues
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raised by the radical right party, close off the political space, and/or align themselves
closely with the radical right party. Figure 10 illustrates these possibilities visually.
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Figure 10: Possible Individual Movements in Political Space Diagram
Moving Away: COI'doning and Competing by Differentiating
As I have just defined above, cordoning and competing by differentiation are
movements by mainstream right parties away from radical right parties. In these
instances, the mainstream parties are attempting to distinguish and distance themselves
from the radical right, but the key difference is that competing suggests an
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the radical right pmiies' position and existence in
the political system while cordoning suggests that the mainstream parties view the radical
right parties and their policy positions as illegitimate, and attempt to clearly, and
drastically, separate themselves and reassert the legitimacy of their own position in the
mainstream.
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Cordoning
The issue of immigration in Belgium presents an illustrative example of
mainstream parties cordoning off the radical right. During the time period of the
diagram, the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang (VB) has been electorally influential and the
National Front (FNb) has been represented in the national parliament in every election
since 1991. The electoral influence of each of these radical right parties is increased once
region is taken into account. Nationally, the most successful election results for VB was
just under 12%, but when just considering votes from Flanders and Brussels, this jumps
to almost 17% (Carter 2005,4-5). A similar story exists for FNb. While they are not
electorally influential, as I have defined it, nationally (generally they receive about 2% of
the vote), when just considering the results from Wallonia and Brussels, they have been,
receiving between 5% and 7% of the vote on several occasions (Carter 2005). I mention
this only to show that there is one radical right party (VB) that is electorally influential
nationally in Belgium, and this influence is increased when only considering the areas in
which they contest elections. In addition, there is a second radical right party (FNb) that
is not electorally influential nationally, but has been electorally influential in the regions
in which they contest elections.
As seen in Figure 9 below, the two main parties of the right, CVP/CD&V and
PRL/MR have made substantial moves away from the radical right on the issue of
immigration since 1990. Although the Christian Democrats did initially move slightly to
the right, that movement has since been more than compensated for. The PRLIMR has
consistently cordoned off the radical right since the initial electoral breakthrough, and the
52
overall result of movement of the CVP/CD&V has also resulted in a cordoning off.
Although I am most concerned with the actions of the two main parties of the right, these
movements are also coupled with movements away fTom the radical right by the main
and secondary parties of the left. Taking all ofthese movements into consideration, as
well as the distance between the radical right parties and the closest mainstream parties,
d monstrates a strong tendency to clearly show the mainstream parties' positions on
immigration are far from those of the radical right parties, and an attempt to define the
radical right as outside the legitimate range of mainstream immigration debate,
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FigUl'C 9: Belgium Immigration Political Space Diagram
Competing by Dlf!erentiating
Denmark has had an electorally influential radical right party represented in the
national parliament since 1988.8 The Progress Party, FRP(d), was electorally successful
from 1988 until 1998 (receiving 6-9% of the vote), and the Danish eople's Party (DF)
has been influential since 1998 (receiving 7-14% of the vote). The main paI1y of the
8 The Progress Party was also electorally successfu I from the first elections it contested in 1973 through
1981, receiving between 8% and 16% of the vote in each election, but Carter does not consider it a
xenophobic party until the mid-1980s.
53
right, The Liberal Party (V) began competing with the radical right since the initial
electoral breakthrough, and began to compete by differentiation in between 1993 and
2000, as seen in Figure 11. The People's Party was founded in 1995, it contested its first
parliamentary elections shortly after in 1998, and in that election won a substantial
portion of the vote (7.4%). It would seem that the combination of some ofthe leadership
of the Progress Party breaking away to form a new party, and the initial and continued
increasing electoral influence of the Danish People's Party was enough to cause the
Liberal Party to respect the legitimacy of the new party and their position in the party
system, while at the same time competing with the party by differentiating its own
position. The People's Party has also been a member of a governing coalition in
Denmark since 2001 with the Liberal Party and the Conservative People's Party (KF).
This does not translate into a movement of the Liberal Party toward the radical right,
however. The People's Party was brought into the coalition as a minority partner, and
not given positions in the cabinet. This allows governing cooperation among the three
parties, but maintains the competition of the Liberal Party as differentiating, rather than
engaging, the radical right party.
These two examples were intended to demonstrate when, why, and how
mainstream right parties might be adopting strategies of moving away from radical right
parties. In Belgium, the mainstream parties moved dramatically away from the VB on
immigration, effectively cordoning off the radical right party. In the Danish case, the
Liberal Party acknowledged the legitimate place of the radical right, following a
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reorganization of the radical right and increased electoral success, and adjusted their
positions to compete with it but at the same time differentiate its own position.
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Figure 11: Denmark LeftlRight Political Space Diagram
Moving Toward: Competing by Engaging and Co-opting
As in the previous section, I will now discuss a couple examples of when
mainstream parties have responded to an electorally influential radical right part)' by
moving toward the radical right, either by engaging with or co-opting the space of the
radical right patty.
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Competing by Engaging
The Austrian Freedom Party (FPG) has been electorally influential in every
election since it was founded in 1956. In the first three decades of its existence, it
received 5-8% of the vote in national parliamentary elections. It nearly doubled its share
of the vote in the 1986 election (to 9.7%), the same year Jorg Haider took over as party
leader. Support continued to rise through the 1990s, topping out at nearly 27% in 1999.
This 27% place the FPG in second place nationally and was greater than the Austrian
People's Party (GVP), which had, up until this election, always come in first or second.
Following this election, the FPG entered into a coalition government as a junior partner
with the GVP. The FPG saw their support slashed in the next election, in 2002, to 10%,
but they maintained their junior position in the coalition government. Haider left the
party in 2005 to form the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZG), but the FPG was able
to maintain some support in the 2006 election (11 %), and increased it support to 17% in
the most recent election of2008. In addition, Haider's new party received 4% of the vote
in 2006 and nearly 11 % in 2008, putting the total vote share for the radical right parties at
about 15% in 2006 and about 28% in 2008. From this information, at least electorally
speaking, the FPG, and the radical right more generally, has been influential in Austria
since 1986.
As seen in Figure 6 below, the GVP has shown a consistent tendency to compete
with the FPG by engaging, aside from the 1989-1993. Since Haider's rise to party leader
in the 1980s, the GVP has been competing with the radical right party, mostly by
engaging, but with a stint of differentiation in the early 1990s. The FPG moved further to
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the right (following Haider's lead) while the People's Party shifted its position to the left.
However, from 1993-2006, the OVP has shown a consistent trend of engaging the radical
right party. For much of this time the FPO has had electoral results in the 20% range
andlor the two parties have been in coalition govemments together. Taken together,
these two factors both provide rationale for and evidence of the OVP competing with the
FPO by engaging. With this movement, the People's Party has acknowledged the
existence and legitimacy of the Fr edom Party and has shown its willingness to work
with the FPO and its radical right policy positions by taking them in as a junior partner in
a coalition government.
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Figure 6: Austria Left/Right Political Space Diagram
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Co-opting
Like competitive engagement, co-opting is a movement toward the radical right
by mainstream right parties. However, the movement is more dramatic in these cases.
The rational is similar, but not identical. It seems that the mainstream parties are
acknowledging the legitimacy of the radical right party's positions, but not necessarily
the legitimacy of the party itself, or at least not the ownership of the radical right party of
these positions. In Switzerland, for example, two radical right parties, the Freedom Party
of Switzerland (FPS) and the Swiss Democrats (SD), were represented in parliament for
much ofthe 1990s. However, neither party reached the 5% necessary to be electorally
influential, as I have defmed it. The Swiss Democrats best election results were in 1991
and 1995 when they received about 3% of the vote, and the FPS topped out at 4% in
1995. Neither party has had substantial electoral success since then, nor has either party
been represented in the national parliament since 2007 (the SD won one seat in 1999 and
2003, and the FPS fell out of parliament in 1999).
This does not mean that the ideas and principles of the radical right are not
influential in Switzerland. Figure 12 shows that, since the time period following the
initial, albeit limited, electoral success of the SD and FPS, the political space of these
radical right parties was co-opted by the mainstream parties of the right. During that time
period, all of the mainstream political parties in Switzerland have shifted dramatically
toward the radical right. The most dramatic move toward the radical right was made by
the Swiss People's Party (SVP), the largest right wing party in Switzerland. This cannot
only explain the lack of further electoral successes by the SD and/or the FPS (there were
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no longer room to compete to the right of the mainstream right), but it is also evidence of
the influence these parties and the positions of the radical right have had on the political
space. It is arguable that the SVP has co-opted the space and ideas of the radical right
parties reducing the electoral success of the parties themselves, but at the same time
increasing the salience of the radical right positions, I will discuss this case with more
attention given to qualitative evidence in the following chapter.
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FigUl'c 12: Switzerland Left/Right Political Space Diagram
An · xample of Mnltiple Strategies
The overall political space in Norway provides an example of a patty using
multiple strategies in response to a radical right party having electoral success. The
Progress Party, FRP(n), had modest electoral success (3%-4.5%) until the election of
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1989 when it received 13% ofthe vote. It has been electorally influential since, and has
steadily increased its share of the vote to its current position ofalmost 23% ofthe vote
(although, there was a significant setback in 1993; dropping from 13% in 1989 down to
just over 6%). In 1997 it overtook the Conservative Party (H0)'re, H), as the second
largest party in parliament, and the largest party on the right. Aside from the election of
2001, it has remained in this position.
Since the initial breakthrough of the Progress Party, the paths of it and the
Conservative Party have generally moved together. While this could be due to them both
reacting similarly to exogenous factors, a closer examination of these paths in Figure 4
below, in connection with election results, make it difficult to completely eliminate the
possibility of H0)'re responding to the Progress Party. Following the first major electoral
success of the Progress Party in 1989, H0)'re co-opted the political space of the radical
right party by moving drastically to the right. This co-optation was followed by the
substantial decline in the electoral success of the Progress Party.9 Immediately following
this decline, the Conservative Party competed with the Progress Party by differentiating
its position slightly, and in the following election, 1997, the FRP(n) overtook H0)'re as
the second largest party. This prompted the Conservative Party to move back to the right,
and to engage with the radical right party. The Conservative Party's trend to the right has
continued through 2006, and, when coupled with a movement of the FRP(n) to the left,
H0)'re even appears further to the right than the Progress Party in the most recent expert
survey.
9 It is important to note that these votes were not lost directly to H0Yre. The Conservative Party also saw a
decline in votes in 1993. The Center Party (SP) saw the most substantial increase in support.
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Figure 4: Norway Left/Right Political Space Diagram
Analyzing the Role of Ideology
This chapter began by showing that there certainly are some patterns of change in
political space, but many of these patterns are mitigated by counterexamples that seem to
draw into question their direct connection to radical right parties. Then I began to look
more closely at the movements of individual parties in cases during time periods of
electorally influential radical right parties. Having shown some instances of cordoning,
competing, and co-opting in some of these cases in the previous two sections, I can now
discuss how these strategies vary across the available cases.
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As mentioned earlier, the most electorally successful radical right parties have
been of type 3 or type 4 in Elisabeth Carter's typology. These parties are authoritarian
xenophobic parties and neo-liberal xenophobic parties, respectively. They are both
xenophobic and culturist, but type 3 demand reforms of less democracy and more state
intervention while type 4 demands more democratic reforms and less state intervention.
This seems to be an electoral sweet spot of ideology for radical right parties - not as
isolated as the crazy fringe of the neo-Nazi or neo-fascist parties, but not lost in the
shadow ofthe mainstream right like neo-liberal populist parties. The following analysis
will concentrate on this area of the radical right ideological spectrum. When I refer to a
more-extreme radical right party or ideology, I will be referencing an authoritarian
xenophobic party or ideology (type 3), and when I refer to a less-extreme radical right
party or ideology, I will be referring to a neo-liberal xenophobic party (type 4). I will
only be looking at countries with an electorally influential radical right party, and only
during and shortly after this electoral influence occurs. I am not arguing this is the only
circumstance under which radical right parties have influence on other political parties,
but this is one situation that allows me to investigate a portion of the role party ideology
might play. These criteria have limited the number of cases to three in each category. In
the authoritarian xenophobic group, I will be looking at the impact of the FPO in Austria,
the VB and FNb in Belgium, and the FN in France. The neo-liberal xenophobic parties I
will be examining the influence of are the DF and FRP(d) in Denmark, the FRP(n) in
Norway, and the ND in Sweden.
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Due to the small sample size, I have not run rigorous statistical analysis on this
data, but interesting findings do emerge with some simple math. First of all, mainstream
right parties faced with a more-extreme radical right party are more likely to move away
from the challenger, by cordoning or differentiating, than their counterparts in countries
with a less-extreme radical right party. And, inversely, mainstream right parties are more
likely to move toward a less-extreme radical right party by engaging or co-opting. In
total, when faced with a challenge from an authoritarian xenophobic party, mainstream
parties moved away, cordoned or differentiated, 60% of the time, while when faced with
a challenge from a neo-liberal xenophobic party, mainstream parties moved away 46% of
the time. This difference is almost entirely made up of differences in the drastic
movements - cordoning and co-opting. Authoritarian xenophobic parties were cordoned
off about 28% of the time while there were no instances ofneo-liberal xenophobic parties
being cordoned off. Similarly, mainstream right parties co-opted the space ofneo-liberal
xenophobic parties 15% of the time, while there was not a single case ofmainstream
parties co-opting the space of an authoritarian xenophobic party.
The majority ofthe movements that occurred were slight, competing either by
differentiating or engaging. The movements took place both in cases with more-extreme
and in cases with less-extreme radical right parties in total and on the overall left/right
dimension, but a larger difference can be seen on the issue of immigration. In fact, the
percentage of slight movements is nearly identical in each instance on the overall scale
(87% for type 3 and 87.5% for type 4), but the difference is that the remaining drastic
movements were movements away from type 3 parties and toward type 4 parties. A
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larger discrepancy is visible on the issue of immigration. Similar numbers exist for the
slight movements in cases with less-extreme radical right parties (80% compete by
differentiating or engaging, and 20% co-opt), but the same does not carry over to the
other category. More-extreme radical right parties are cordoned off on the issue of
immigration 50% of the time. Table 1 shows how individual movements of mainstream
right parties were characterized over time.
Finding that the response of mainstream parties is more drastic on immigration is
an interesting finding because it is correlated with party ideology, but it does not
necessarily stem directly from the ideological differences. Both groups of radical right
parties are xenophobic and culturist, but differ in the role of the state. According to this
evidence, it is not necessarily the radical right party's xenophobia that the mainstream
parties are reacting to. Mainstream right parties are more likely to cordon off a radical
right party if it is authoritarian and demands less democratic reforms, but this reaction is
taken on the issue most central to the radical right party, immigration, even though it does
not seem to be the most salient issue the mainstream parties are responding to. In other
words, radical right parties are intrinsically linked to the issue of immigration, and the
differences in how mainstream parties react to radical right parties are manifested in this
issue area even if the different reactions of the mainstream parties result from disparities
on separate ideological dimensions.
To sum up the findings of this section, mainstream right parties are more likely to
move toward a less-extreme radical right party than a more-extreme radical right party
and vice versa. This difference is almost entirely made up of differences in the drastic
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movements of cordoning and co-opting, and is more apparent on the issue of immigration
than it is in the overallleftiright political space. This is true even though the ideological
difference that distinguishes these radical right parties from one another, the role of the
state, is not directly related to immigration (both groups ofparties are equally
xenophobic).
Table 1: Reactions oflndividual Mainstream Right Parties
Reacting to Type 3 Reacting to Type 4
(Authoritarian Xenophobic Parties) (Neo-Liberal Xenophobic Parties)
Reacting to the FPO in Austria Reacting to the DF and FRP(d) in Denmark
Overall Immigration Overall Immigration
OVP OVP V V
Compete and Engage Compete and Engage Compete and Engage Co-opt
Compete and Diffirentiate Compete and Engage Compete and Engage Compete and Engage
Compete and Engage Compete and Differentiate
Compete and Engage Compete and Differentiate
KF KF
Compete and Diffirentiate Compete and Engage
Compete and Engage Co-opt
Compete and Engage
Reacting to the VB and FNb in Belgium Reacting to the FRP(n) in Norway
Overall Immigration Overall Immigration
CVP/CD&V CVPlCD&V H H
Cordon Compete and Engage Co-opt Compete and Differentiate
Compete and Engage Cordon Compete and Engage Compete and Differentiate
Compete and Engage Compete and Differentiate
Co-opt
PRLIMR PRLIMR KRF KRF
Compete and Engage Cordon Compete and Diffirentiate Compete and Diffirentiate
Compete and Differentiate Cordon Compete and Differentiate Compete and Differentiate
Compete and Differentiate Compete and Differentiate
Reacting to the FN in France Reacting to the ND in Sweden
Overall Immigration Overall Immigratjon
RPR RPR M M
Cordon Compete and Differentiate Compete and Engage Compete and Engage
Compete and Engage Cordon
Compete and Differentiate
Compete and Differentiate
UDF UDF KDS KDS
Compete and Differentiate Compete and Differentiate Compete and Differentiate Compete and Engage
Cordon
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CONCLUSION
This chapter began by looking for evidence of the expected patterns ofparty
movement that appeared in the academic literature. While the political space diagrams
did provide some evidence for these patterns of convergence, divergence, and shifting to
the left or right, the patterns are difficult to connect to the radical right because there is
often counter evidence as well. This led us to look more closely at the movements of
individual parties, and one way of interpreting these movements is that they are distinct
strategies of cordoning off, competing with, and co-opting the space of the radical right
party. I found that the choice of strategy taken by the mainstream right parties seems to
be related to the extremeness of the radical right party's ideology. Mainstream right
parties tend to move toward (by co-opting the space of or competing by engaging with) a
less-extreme radical right party (a neo-liberal xenophobic party) while they tend to move
away from (by cordoning off or competing by differentiating from) a more-extreme
radical right party (an authoritarian xenophobic party). The final finding of this chapter
was that these differences in strategy are most prevalent on the issue of immigration,
even though the ideological differences of the radical right parties are on the role of the
state. It would seem that these distinct strategies are manifested on the issue most closely
associated with the radical right, immigration, even if the parties are responding
differently because of ideological differences on another issue. Now that these
relationships have been established abstractly, across a number of cases, the following
chapter will attempt to put the political space diagrams into a bit more empirical context.
66
CHAPTER IV
CONTEXTUALIZING THE EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter was based on a cross-case analysis of political diagrams and
national election results with a touch ofwithin case logic. This evidence was taken at
face value, without much questioning. However, the conclusions drawn are only as
reliable as the data. Thus, this chapter has two main purposes. The fIrst is to examine the
validity of the data I have been analyzing throughout this project and the second is to use
qualitative evidence to investigate whether or not there are plausible connections between
the movements of parties shown in the expert surveys and the radical right parties. Due
to the limited nature of this project as a thesis, I will only be able to present a handful of
cases, and in limited depth. First, I will revisit two political space diagrams to see if the
movements match up to empirical evidence we know about the parties. In the following
section, I will attempt to establish some mechanisms through which these effects can
travel by fIlling in some of the gaps between the movements in the diagrams and the
actions taken by parties in two additional cases. I will present evidence that suggests, at
least in these cases, mainstream parties have indeed adjusted their positions, as reflected
in the political space diagrams, in response to the radical right parties.
Ideally, not only would I be able to delve deeper into each case, I would also be
able to provide additional small case studies for each of the individual party movements,
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cordoning, competing by differentiating, competing by engaging, and co-opting,
discussed in the previous chapter. Such analysis would provide a clearer insight into
what each of these distinct strategies looks like in practice, and possibly further reveal the
conditions under which each is more likely to be chosen. I would suggest looking at
Belgium, and the cordon sanitaire of the VB, as an exemplar of mainstream parties
cordoning off a radical right party. Looking more closely at changes in party positions on
immigration in Denmark might shed some light on mainstream parties co-opting the
political space of the radical right. The overall left/right political space in Demark could
also make for a likely case study of competing. Each mainstream party of the right, the
Liberal Party (V) and the Conservative People's Party (KF), has had periods of
competing by differentiating as well as periods of competing by engaging. Such a case
study could reveal the degree to which these reflect separate and distinct changes, and the
motivations behind each. In addition, I would like to see a detailed analysis of the
governing coalition of the Liberals and the Conservative People's Party with the support
of the Danish People's Party that is reflected by a convergence of these parties from 2000
to almost identical positions in 2006 in the political space diagram.
VALIDATING THE DATA
To begin the process of examining the results of these expert judgment surveys, I
will take a closer look at the political space diagram of Austria in conjunction with some
things we know about the case to see if the diagram seems to portray a relatively accurate
picture of real life. Following this description, I will present a similar analysis of the
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British case to demonstrate how the movements of the Labour Party and the Conservative
Party visible in the diagram map onto real changes made in policy positions.
The fIrst thing I would like to call your attention to in Figure 6, below, is the
initial positioning of the FPO in the 1980s. One might argue that this moderate position
would call into question either the validity of the data or classifIcation of the party as a
radical right party. Since it is widely agreed that, along with the FN in France, the FPO is
one of the prototypical radical right parties in Western Europe, it causes concern for the
validity of the data source. However, this apparent discrepancy is easily understood and
when put into context actually adds to accuracy of the diagram. Even though the FPO
was founded in the 1950s and its predecessor (VdU) dates back to 1949, it did not match
the defInition of a radical right party until much later. In the early 1980s, the party was
controlled by its liberal faction under Norbert Steger, and entered a coalition government
with the SPO in 1983. It was under the leadership of Jorg Haider that the party took a
turn to the right, and took its current position on the radical right in the party system. In
fact, it was the same year that Haider assumed the leadership role, 1986, that Cas Mudde
initially classifIes the FPO as a populist radical right political party (Mudde 2007,305).
This movement to the right is subsequently reflected in the 1993 survey ofHuber and
Inglehart. In addition to the drastic shift of the FPO to the right, we also see a change in
the direction of the movement of the OVP. In the early 1990s, the party was moving to
the left, but between 1993 and 2000 it reversed directions and headed back toward the
right. It turns out that this movement also matches up with historical events.
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Figure 6: Austria Left/Right Political Space Diagram
Following the election of 1986, the avp and SPO formed a grand coalition
government, at least in part, due to the unwillingness of the SPO to continue to cooperate
with the FPO with Haider as the leader (the two parties had formed a coalition
govemment together following the 1983 elections when the spa lost its absolute
majority). Austria was governed by this grand coalition through the rest of the 1980s and
the 1990s. While this grand coalition is not reflected as a universally consistent
convergence between the two main parties throughout this time period, there is a trend of
convergence. However, this trend ends between 1993 and 2000 due to the change in
direction of the OVP. Following the election of 1999, the spa and OVP were unable to
come to an agreement on a coalition government, and when these negotiations broke
down, an agreement was quickly reached between the OVP and Haider's FPO. The
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OVPIFPO government was sworn in on February 4th, 2000. This coalition was renewed
following the 2002 elections (and later inherited by the BZO, following its split from the
FPO), and continued until 2006 when they lost their majority in parliament. The
formation of the right wing coalition and the willingness of the OVP to work with the
FPO are reflected in the political space diagrams in the movement of the OVP to the right
in the 2000 and 2006 surveys.
The next diagram I will discuss in context is the British political space diagram.
Since the radical right parties in Britain, the British National Party (BNP) and the British
National Front, have not had substantial electoral success, I have not talked much about
the British case much thus far. However, in the context of verifying the data, this case is
as applicable as any other. The most striking trend in this diagram is the substantial and
consistent movement of the Labour Party (L) from the left to the right. This movement
fits with the general perception that many people have of the Labour Party since the early
1980s, but before I take a slightly closer look at the British case in context to verify this
movement, please allow me to first mention the movement of the Conservative Party (C).
The ideology of the Conservative Party moderated economically under the leadership of
John Major, who took over as Prime Minister from Margaret Thatcher in 1990. The
party toned down its approach to privatization, became less focused on a strict laissez-
faire economic model, and due to high unemployment rates in the early 1990s, the party
also took actions to intervene in the economy (Carter 2005, 138). Major also brought the
party closer to the Labour Party with regard to Britain's role in Europe. In contrast to
Thatcher, he wanted Britain to playa more active and central in Europe (Moar 1997).
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These changes made by the Conservative Party are reflected in the movement to the left
shown in Figure 13 between 1989 and 1998. Following a substantial electorally defeat in
1997, the party reverted back to the right under the leadership of William Hague, which
can be seen in the diagram after 1998.
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Figure 13: Britian Left/Right Political Space Diagram
Like with the Conservative Part)', most of the movement of the Labour Party can
be attributed to a reformulation of its economic philosophy. In the 1989 document Meet
the Challenge, Make the Change, the party asserted that "the task of a Labour
government would be restricted to stimulating the market economy, and that intervention
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in the economy by the state would be limited" to market failures (Carter 2005, 137).
Soon after, the party changed its stance on privatized industries and announced it would
not reverse the privatiza~ions that occurred under Thatcher (Carter 2005). In 1995,
Labour removed the clause in its constitution referencing its desire to secure "common
ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange", thus ending its desire
to pursue policies of widespread nationalization (Moar 1997, 227). This final transition
to 'New Labour' was led by Tony Blair and continued under his tenure as Prime
Minister. Further evidence is provided by Blair's close alliance with the United States,
under the leadership of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. Translated to the
political space diagram, these changes made by the Labour Party are seen as movements
to the right during every time period, all but one of which are quite substantial.
Since the political space diagrams have been constructed based upon the
perceptions of people, I felt that it was necessary to look a little more closely at some of
these diagrams in connection with some qualitative elements to make sure they captured
some of demonstrable changes in party positions. The preceding discussion of the party
systems in Austria and Britain suggest that the diagrams do fairly accurately portray real
shifts in party positions. In both cases, the movements of the parties seen in the diagrams
can be connected to real changes made in party positions and attitudes and vice-versa.
The final necessary step in this project is to look at additional cases in order to see
whether or not there are possible connections between these visible movements and the
radical right.
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CONNECTING MOVEMENTS TO ACTIONS
Although it will not be possible to eliminate other possible causes completely in
this short final chapter, it is possible to demonstrate that there are at least plausible
connections between some of the shifts in party position and radical right parties and
ideas. Like the previous section, this section will discuss two diagrams and provide
qualitative evidence. The evidence provided will focus on the rationale for changing
positions in order to help determine whether these shifts are in response to exogenous
factors or if they are related to the presence of a radical right party. The cross-case
analysis conducted in the previous chapter necessitated a threshold for defining a radical
right party as electorally influential when looking for effects on party positioning, but the
same is not true when investigating this qualitative evidence. In addition to looking more
closely at the French political space, I will use this section as an opportunity to explore
alternative avenues of influence by looking at one case, Switzerland, which did not have
a radical right party reach the 5% share of the vote to be considered electorally relevant in
the cross-case analysis. By including this case here, I am able to explore another way
that the radical right can influence political space. This is important because the limiting
the influence of the radical right to cases in which a party has gotten more that 5% of the
vote for the national parliament may have been necessary for a particular analysis but it is
not reasonable to assume these are the only circumstances under which the radical right
can alter the positions of mainstream parties. Before I do this, however, let me first
begin with the French case, an instance where the National Front has been influential and
electorally relevant for many years.
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The first way that the radical right has had an effect on the mainstream political
parties ofFrance has been through altering the political agenda and policy priorities.
Martin Schain has shown that "the issue priorities of the National Front and its voters
appear to have influenced the priorities of those voting for other political parties" (Schain
2002, 230-231). In 1984, 26% supporters of the FN already placed a relatively high
priority on immigration, but few supporters of other political parties did the same.
However, by 1988, immigration ranked second in importance only to unemployment, was
on par with social inequality, and was far more important than concerns over the
environment, corruption, and the construction of Europe (Schain 2002, 231). Schain
points out that the "issue priorities of voters changed after the breakthrough of the
National Front [in 1986], rather than before, and the change was very rapid" (Schain
2002, 231). FN voters continued to place more importance on immigration than
supporters of other parties, but the difference has diminished. He concludes that an effect
of the FN has been an increased importance of immigration issues in the political system
since the issue has become a "less important way of differentiating FN voters from
supporters of other political parties" (Schain 2002, 231). Altering the political agenda is
an important impact attributable to the FN, and radical right parties more generally, but
this type of effect may not clearly show up on the political space diagrams as I have
constructed them since they do not really factor in the relative importance or weight on
any particular issue. However, there is also evidence to suggest that the FN has also
changed the positions parties have taken on the issue of immigration, as seen in Figure 2
below.
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Figure 2: France Immigration Political Space Diagram
In addition to immigration becoming a more salient issue across the electorate
following the electoral breakthrough of the FN in 1986, mainstream political parties also
subsequently adjusted their positions on the issue. In the late 1980s, there was some
internal struggle within the RPR as to how to best respond to Le Pen and the FN. Charles
Pasqua, RPR interior minister from 1986-1988, declared that the mainstream right shared
many common values with the FN (Marcus 1995, 141), but Chirac, Prime Minister at the
time, issued contradictory statements on immigration and indicating a lack of a clear
strategy of how to deal with Le Pen (Goldey and Johnson 1988, 197). At this point, any
changes seemed to be largely in rhetoric (Weil 2001) and the right-wing government of
1986··88 did not deliver on its promise of bringing forth a new nationality bill (Carter
2005, 117). However, this change in rhetoric resulted in a redefinition of immigration
"from a labor market problem to an integration/incorporation problem; to a problem that
touches on national identity; to problems of education, housing, law and order; to
problems of citizenship requirements" (Schain 2002, 238). The increase in salience and
the redefinition of the issue forced all mainstream parties to address immigration. In
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1997, newly elected Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin formed a commission to
study the subject. Shortly after its appointment, it recommended accepting most of the
changes made to immigration and nationalization legislation made by the previous
government of the right.
This centrist approach was designed to move toward policies of consensus among
the mainstream parties while at the same time isolating the FN (Schain 2002,238). This
change in party positions and approach toward the center, looking to build consensus and
isolate the radical right, is visible in the political space diagram of immigration in France
above. Not only did the parties of the right need to moderate their respective stances on
immigration in order to isolate the radical right, but the parties of the left also needed to
moderate their positions on immigration in order to build consensus. Both movements
are visible on the diagram, and both can be, at least in part, attributed to the electoral
influence and rhetorical redefinition brought about by Jean Marie Le Pen and the Front
National.
The previous discussion of immigration in France is a case in which an electorally
influential radical right party altered the political space through its electoral success and
powerful rhetoric. The following discussion will be from Switzerland, a case without an
electorally influential radical right party, but a case that has shown a strong movement of
political parties toward the right since the 1993. While the previous cross-case analysis
did not allow the examination of this case due to the lack of electoral success of a radical
right party, a qualitative discussion will allow me to examine the drastic shift to the right
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in Switzerland shown in Figure 12, and to show that the ideology of the radical right
ideology can be influential without substantial electoral success of a patty.
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Figure 12: Switzerland Left/Right Political Space Diagram
As can be seen above, each political patty in Switzerland moved substantially to
the right between 1993 and 2000. This occurred despite the fact that neither the Freedom
Party (FPS) nor the Swiss Democrats (SD) has achi ved electoral relevance, as I have
defined it. Both patties were represented in parliament (with between 1 and 7 seats, and
up to 4% of the vote) in the 1990s, but neither sustained this minimal electoral success.
One might suggest that this shift was caused by an increase in immigration and/or the
number foreign-born residents from Islamic nations, but this does not appear to be the
case either. During this time period, immigration from Islamic nations and the number of
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foreign-born residents from Islamic nations remained fairly constant (OECD 2008). If
this change is not directly attributable to a strong electoral presence of a radical right
party, nor a drastic increase in immigration, then what else may be at play here?
As I have noted earlier, electoral success is not the only way the radical right can
influence the positions of other political parties. In Switzerland, it would seem that either
the mainstream right party co-opted the issue and rhetoric of the radical right, squeezing
out any room for political success, either out of a strategic calculation of political
opportunity or an increased salienc~ of immigration. I showed in the previous figure that
across the board, the mainstream parties moved to the right on a general left/right scale,
but Figure 14 shows that the same is not true on the issue of immigration. In this
instance, only the main right party, the Swiss People's Party (SVP) moved substantially
to the right on immigration. Not only that, but the SVP was also considerably closer to
the radical right than the other mainstream parties.
0 20 40 60 80 100
GPS SPS CVP FDP LPS SVP APS/FPS SD
1990 ..J_
·
·
·
.
2000 -.
2006 -l
Figure 14: Switzerland Immigration Political Space Diagram
This movement could be interpreted as a co-optation of the political space of the
radical right, which prevented further electoral success. In addition to the political space
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being co-opted, the SVP has also taken on the rhetoric and imagery of a radical right
party on the issue of immigration. In various electoral campaigns, the party has focused
on the use of xenophobic images in its propaganda. Images of a white sheep kicking a
black sheep off of the Swiss flag, dark skinned hands reaching into a basket of Swiss
public benefits, and black missile-like minarets protruding a Swiss flag with a veiled
Muslim person have been included in its recent election posters. These xenophobic
images would normally be associated with the core values of a radical right party, but in
this case they are being used by the mainstream right party. Perhaps the SVP sees this as
a calculated attempt to appeal to voters, or maybe it is incorporating the ideological
components of a radical right party. The cases I have discussed in this project do not
exist on isolated islands, and in fact are relatively close to one another geographically.
This space is further minimized be electronic communications and interactions. Having
seen the electoral success of radical right parties in other European countries, the SVP
incorporating the issues and tactics ofa radical right party can simultaneously increase its
own electoral support as well as eliminate a potential challenge from a radical right party.
Regardless of the rationale, the tactic seems to be working, as the SVP has been the
largest party in parliament in the last two elections and the electorate passing a recent
measure banning the construction of minarets.
While the Swiss case does not meet my initial qualification of having an
electorally influential radical right party, the core principle of the radical right,
xenophobia, is certainly influential in Switzerland. Perhaps precisely because there was
not an electorally successful radical right party, the mainstream right Swiss People's
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Party has adopted the rhetoric, images, and tactics of a radical right party. Regardless of
whether this is attributable to a cross-national diffusion of ideas from radical right parties
in other countries or an internal radicalization of party ideology, xenophobia is influential
in Swiss politics. While there is not an electorally influential radical right party, the SVP
has in many ways played the same role, but also has the legitimacy of being a mainstream
party, and the largest party in parliament.
CONCLUSION
This chapter was intended to serve two purposes. First, though a discussion of
changes in party positions in Austria and Britain, I attempted to show that the political
space diagrams this project has been based upon do, in fact, match up to demonstrable
changes in policy positions, strategies, and attitudes. Following this validation of the
data, I discussed qualitative evidence in the French and the Swiss cases that shows that
making connects between these party movements and the radical right does not seem to
be entirely erroneous. In France, the mainstream parties sought a centrist, consensus
building approach to immigration, at least in part, to isolate the radical right. In
Switzerland, although there has not been a strong electoral presence of a radical right
party, the mainstream right party has adopted many of the themes, strategies, and images
often associated with the radical right. This suggests the possibility of electoral
opportunism, preemptive co-optation, and/or an international diffusion of effects. Taken
together, the two sections of this chapter show that these diagrams do capture real
movements ofpolitical parties and that these movements could be connected to the
radical right.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
This project has engaged in a process of defining the radical right, reviewing the
academic literature for expected effects of the radical right, compared patterns of
movements of party systems and individual parties across a selection of cases, and
contextualized these movements with real changes in policy positions to verify the data
and to connect the movements to the radical right. This final concluding chapter will
review the substantive results of the research conducted in this project and suggest some
areas for future research. I will finally conclude with some closing thoughts on the
subject.
SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUSIONS
Despite substantial limitations on time, resources, and language, this project has
produced several conclusions regarding the effects of radical right political parties in
Western Europe. Some of these conclusions have been substantiated more than others,
but all have some degree of empirical support. The cross-case analysis provided
evidence of some broad patterns of movements in party systems that the academic
literature suggested one would find. It also allowed for more substantive analysis of
individual party movements. The contextualization done in Chapter IV demonstrated that
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these movements do match fairly well onto real changes in party policy positions and
provided evidence suggesting that some of these movements may be a result of the
radical right.
The empirical research began by focusing on the potential patterns ofparty
movements caused by radical right parties that one might expect to find based upon the
academic literature. I looked for patterns of convergence, divergence, shifting to the left,
and shifting to the right, and found evidence supporting connections of each broad pattern
to the radical right. There is evidence of convergence both between the left and the right
and within the left and the right in France on an overall left/right dimension as well as on
the issue of immigration. Upon an initial glance at election results, it seems that this
movement could be related to the presence of the Front National. However, there is also
substantial convergence within the right, and between the right and left in Germany, a
country without the strong national electoral influence of a radical right party. This
makes it difficult to argue, based on this evidence alone, that the radical right is
necessarily linked to such a pattern. Looking at the political space ofNorway, I found
evidence that suggested that the Progress Party (FRP(n)) may have caused a divergence,
or polarization of the mainstream right as it appears that the two main parties of the right
have responded differently, with the Christian Democrats (KRF) becoming more of a
centrist party and the Conservative Party (H0y're) moving toward the radical right. A
similar movement did not appear on the issue of immigration though, which one would
expect if the movement was in direct response to the Progress Party since this is the issue
most closely associated with the radical right.
83
In addition to convergence and divergence, there is also evidence that suggests
that directional shifts (to the right or to the left) could also be an effect of the radical
right. I showed that there is a fairly consistent pattern of drifting to the right in the
Austrian political space, which seems to correlate with the electoral fortunes of the FPO.
A similar, though less pronounced, pattern is found on the issue of immigration
suggesting that it could be connected to the radical right. A more striking shift to the
right is seen on the issue of immigration in Denmark, but the overall party positions are
fairly constant over time, indicating that the radical right parties have potentially
redefined the issue but have had little impact in a broader sense. There was a substantial,
almost universal, shift to the left on immigration in Belgium across the political space,
and among the parties of the right in France. Both of these movements seem to be
correlated with the electoral successes of the respective radical right parties.
After analyzing the patterns ofmovement that the scholarship suggested one
might expect to find, I looked more closely at the individual movements ofparticular
mainstream right parties, which could be in response to an electorally influential radical
right party. I have interpreted these individual movements as separate strategies of how
mainstream parties could attempt to adjust their positions to address the rise of a radical
right party. These movements were interpreted as cordoning off (a drastic move away),
competing with by differentiating from (a slight move away), competing with by
engaging (a slight move toward), and co-opting the space of (a drastic move toward) the
radical right. The strategy chosen in a given instance seems to be related to the ideology
of the radical right party in the political system. I found that mainstream right parties
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were more likely to move toward a less-extreme radical right party (a neo-liberal
xenophobic party) and away from a more-extreme radical right party (an authoritarian
xenophobic party). This difference is made up almost entirely on the margins as most
parties end up competing with the radical right party, either by engaging or
differentiating. The mainstream parties, however, occasionally co-opt the space of a neo-
liberal xenophobic party and cordon off an authoritarian xenophobic party. This
distinction is stronger on the issue of immigration, as authoritarian parties are cordoned
off on immigration roughly half of the time. This is true even though the ideological
difference that the mainstream parties are seemingly responding to is not closely related
to immigration. However, it is the issue most closely associated with the radical right
party family.
Following the analysis based on cross-case comparisons of the movements of
parties in political space, I looked more closely at a handful of cases. I traced the
movements of parties in two cases to see how well the shifts in position matched onto
real changes in party behavior. In Austria, changes in party position captured by the
expert judgment surveys seems to map fairly closely onto changes in policy preferences
and coalition strategies made by the FPO, OVP, and SPO. The shifts of the Conservative
Party and the Labour Party in Britain also seem to match real adjustments in policy
position, particularly with regard to economic policy, domestically and vis-a-vis the
preferred role of Britain in Europe. I suspect that similar analyses could be done for each
case. Once I verified that the data does seem to capture real changes in party positioning,
I provided qualitative evidence from two cases to suggest that, in these instances, the
85
movements may be connected to the radical right. In France, the convergence toward a
centrist position seen on immigration was, at least in part, out of an explicit effort to build
consensus among the mainstream parties and to isolate Le Pen and the Front National. I
also looked at the Swiss case, a case without an electorally influential radical right party,
to explore the possibility of other avenues through which the effects of the radical right
could flow. In this instance, there was a drastic shift to the right by almost every political
party, but the most pronounced movement was from the main party of the right, the Swiss
People's Party (SVP). The SVP seems to have taken on some of the characteristics ofa
radical right party either through a strategic vote maximizing strategy, a preemptive co-
optation, an internalization of ideology, or an international diffusion of effects. While a
more detailed analysis may be able to more accurately discern the actual mechanism, my
exploration at least shows that there may be other ways in which the radical right can
influence mainstream party positions, and politics, even without strong electoral success.
It was important to note that there were also movements of parties and patterns of shifts
in political space in countries without electorally influential radical right parties. While
this does not help my argument, it does not eliminate the possibility that in these cases,
the radical right parties are influencing the movement of the mainstream parties
regardless of electoral success. It may also be indicative of the imperfect nature of using
electoral influence as a defining parameter of this study. It is highly likely that the
radical right has effects outside of these requirements through changes in rhetoric,
redefinition of issues, altering agendas and priorities, and international diffusion. These
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effects could be more thoroughly investigated in a more in-depth investigation of the
context of each individual case.
FUTURE RESEARCH
The next step I would like to take with this project is expanding the discussion of
qualitative evidence in each of these cases. A path in this direction that could be
immediately pursued would be to provide additional small case studies, like those in
Chapter IV, for each of the individual party movements discussed in Chapter III,
cordoning, competing by differentiating, competing by engaging, and co-opting. Such
analysis would provide a clearer insight into what each of these distinct strategies looks
like in practice, and possibly further reveal the conditions under which each is more
likely to be chosen. I would suggest looking at Belgium, and the cordon sanitaire of the
VB, to illustrate what it looks like for mainstream parties to cordon off a radical right
party. Looking more closely at changes in party positions on immigration in Denmark
might shed some light on mainstream parties co-opting the political space of the radical
right. The overall left/right political space in Demark could also make for a likely case
study of competing. Each mainstream party of the right, the Liberal Party (V) and the
Conservative People's Party (KF), has had periods of competing by differentiating as
well as periods of competing by engaging. Such a case study could reveal the degree to
which these reflect separate and distinct changes, and the motivations behind each. In the
future, I would like to see the results of additional expert judgment surveys, which would
allow similar analyses to be conducted well into the future. I would be interested to see
how recent developments in European politics would translate into movements of parties
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in political space. In particular, I would like to see the changes in the parties of the
mainstream right of France, and the initiatives of President Nicolas Sarkozy correspond
to party movements. It seems to be the popular perception that Sarkozy has taken a
strategy of competing with the FN by engaging the party, and I am curious whether this
would appear as such in this context.
In addition, due to time, resource, and language constraints, I was not able to get
as deep into the qualitative evidence as I would have liked. In particular, I would like to
conduct more research on particular changes in policy preferences made by the
mainstream parties, and to more deeply explore the rationale behind these changes. As
this project stands now, it has shown that there are uncontrolled correlations between the
factors being investigated and that there are plausible connections to the radical right
party. Yet in order to more definitively make these claims, further in-depth analysis
needs to be done to determine the motivation behind the party movements. Ideally one
would, among other things, interview int1uential party leaders, analyze party propaganda,
and read local news sources in order to understand the causal connections between the
radical right and the movement of mainstream parties. This type of analysis could begin
to uncover whether changes in party position were based upon exogenous factors,
strategic calculations, adoption of or reaction to ideological principles, or a redefinition of
particular issues.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This project stemmed from an interest in how immigrant communities were
integrated into local societies. As I began to explore the subject, I came across literature
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on radical right parties and their opposition to immigration. These parties, and their
rhetoric, propaganda, and political style stood in direct opposition to, and presented a
great obstacle for, the integration and social equity of immigrant communities. The more
I read about the subject, the more fascinated I became. It seemed that media accounts,
and even the academic literature, portrayed the radical right as a pariah, while at the same
time, no one ever seemed quite sure what impact, if any, radical right parties actually had.
Most of the scholarship was devoted to explaining the rise and electoral success of radical
right parties with, what seemed to be, an underlying assumption that these parties were
"bad". For quite some time, the ideology of the radical right was thought to be alien to,
and run contradictory to, many democratic values and practices. However, it has been
shown that it may be better to think ofmany of the principles as radical interpretations of
mainstream beliefs (Mudde 2008). Why, then, is there an apparent fear, and need to
explain, the limited popularity of radical right parties unless they have some sort of
impact? This led me to want to explain what types of effects the radical right might have.
Without the ability to travel and conduct in-depth field research on the subject, I
sought other ways to get at that question. I found that a likely way that the radical right
parties could have substantial impacts was through other political parties. Still, I would
ideally like to conduct more contextually based research into how exactly radical right
parties illicit change in other political parties, but using the expert judgment surveys has
allowed me to capture some of the correlations one might expect to find. Although I was
only able to supply a few qualitative details to fill in the gaps, it does seem that these
relationships are plausible. I would like to further analyze if and how radical right parties
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have redefined issues, if and how they have changed the language of politics, if and how
they have altered the coalition possibilities, and if and how they have changed policy
priorities, agendas, and outcomes.
After trying to get at this question through this small cut into the subject, I have a
sense the radical right parties do have an impact on politics, and one way this can be seen
is through the positions of the mainstream parties in political space, and the changes in
these positions over time. While they may not be mounting "a general attack on the
parliaments", they have forced the mainstream parties to address their presence and
change their political positions and coalition strategies accordingly (Fromm and
Kembach 1994, 9; quoted in Mudde 2007, 1). Although I still maintain that the
underlying fear of radical right parties is unnecessarily exaggerated, we may be giving
them too much credit, some apprehension is not completely unfounded.
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APPENDIX A
COUNTRY LEVEL RAW DATA
Additional information, including questionnaires, can be found by consulting the original
sources (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Laver
1995, 1998; Laver and Mair 1999; Lubbers 2000; Ray and Narud 2000; Benoit and Laver
2006).
AUSTRIA
Table 1: Austria LeftlRight Data
Huber and Benoit and
Castles and Laver and Inglehart Lubbers Laver
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
FPO 68 67 85 85 86
OVP 58 67 58 63 70
LIF 59 44
SPO 30 41 41 43 41
GRON 24 21 25 23
Table 2: Austria Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
FPO 88 91 93
OVP 55 64 68
LIF 21 21
SPO 44 60 45
GRON 10 11 9
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BELGIUM
Table 3: Belgium Left/Right Data
Castles and Laver and Huber and Benoit and
Mair Hunt Inglehart Lubbers Laver
Party (1982) (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
FNb 95 94
VB 98 84 93 94
N-VA 70
PVVNLD 78 58 68 71
PRL/MR 76 63 70 66 62
VU 68 71 61 51
CVP/CD&V 58 75 56 58 60
PSC/CDH 63 70 52 57 51
FDF 56 49 67
SP/SP.A 29 24 36 36 30
AGALAEV/Groen 45 36 27 27 13
ECOLO 45 36 28 21 13
PS 25 24 33 33 18
KPB 14
Table 4: Belgium Immigration Data
Lubbers Lubbers Benoit and
Party (2000) (2000) Laver (2006)
1990 2000 2006
FNb 98.1 98 96
VB 97 98 99
N-VA 64
PVVNLD 69 72 65
PRL/MR 70 61 49
VU 54 51
CVP/CD&V 55 59 39
PSC/CDH 50.1 50 53
FDF
SP/SP.A 40 50 26
AGALAEV/Groen 17 18 10
ECOLO 12 12 10
PS 35 33 28
KPB
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BRITAIN
Table 5: Britain Left/Right Data
Castles Laver and Huber and Benoit and
and Mair Hunt Inglehart Laver Lubbers Laver
Party (1982) (1989) (1993) (1998) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 1998 2000 2006
BNP 95
C 78 80 75 69 71 82
SDP 46
Lib 50 34 47 28 40 40
SNP 44 36 33 33 36
L 23 26 38 44 44 55
PC 34 32 33 31 30
GP 28
Table 6: Britain Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
BNP 99 99
C 72 73 68
SDP
Lib 39 38 30
SNP 37 45 42
L 45 56 45
PC 39 41 41
GP 23 22
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DENMARK
Table 7: Denmark LeftlRight Data
Huber and Benoit and
Castles and Laver and Inglehart Lubbers Laver
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
FRP(d) 87 83 90 87 91
DF 87 75
V 67 73 79 77 74
KF 73 67 73 72 75
KRF 62 76 58 59 54
CD 57 55 56 56 54
RV 48 42 52 48 44
SD 38 37 36 40 35
SF 19 19 21 25 19
EL 11 10 7
VS 8 7
Table 8: Denmark Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
FRP(d) 91 92 97
DF 94 97 97
V 66 75 76
KF 64 69 79
KRF 40 41 43
CD 35 40 31
RV 26 29 22
SD 34 53 57
SF 14 15 16
EL 7 9 13
------------------
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FRANCE
Table 9: France Left/Right Data
Huber and Benoit and
Castles and Laver and Inglehart Lubbers Laver
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
FN 98 93 100 95 89
RPR 82 70 76 75 72
UDF 66 61 63 64 65
MRG 38 34 42
PS 26 26 35 34 31
VEe 25 38 26 18
PCF 14 20 14 15 26
Table 10: France Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
FN 96 96 97
RPR 78 74 62
UDF 68 67 53
PS 31 37 32
VEC 16 11 12
PCF 20 19 29
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GERMANY
Table 11: Germany Left/Right Data
Huber and Benoit and
Castles and Laver and Inglehart Lubbers Laver
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
DVU 94 97
Republikaner 92 87 94
CSU 79 77 70 71 68
CDU 67 68 60 64 68
FDP 51 54 52 60 67
SPD 33 30 31 40 42
G 28 16 21 33 36
DKP 14 10
PDS 6 16 18
Table 12: Germany Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
DVU 98 98 98
Republikaner 93 94 97
CSU 76 80 73
CDU 65 68 73
FDP 44 46 40
SPD 37 42 39
G 17 18 14
DKP 29
PDS 29 27 26
-------_._---
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GREECE
Table 13: Greece LeftlRight Data
Huber and Benoit and
Castles and Laver and Inglehart Lubbers Laver
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
EM 98
PA 79
ND 72 74 78
DKK 42
PASOK 32 51 52
SAP 37
KKE 28 16 32
Kkes 18
Table 14: Greece Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
EM 90 96
PA 75 75
ND 52 69 73
DKK 55 55
PASOK 52 49 47
SAP 30 34 17
KKE 28 31 44
Kkes
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ITALY
Table 15: Italy LeftlRight Data
Huber and
Castles and Laver and Inglehart Lubbers Benoit and
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) Laver (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
Ms-Ft 97
MSI 91 84 93
AN 82 84
LN 72 76 84
FI 67 77
PLI 59 58 70
DC 54 68 59
CCDIUDC 59 60
PRI 48 50 51
PSDI 54 44 47
SVP 48
PPI 45
SDI 40
PSI 31 35 44
DS 17 30 26
PR 23 20
V 21 18 26 16
PCI 16 16
PDCI 12
PdUP 6
DP 5 5
PRC 0 7 6
Table 16: Italy Immigration Data
Lubbers Lubbers Benoit and
Party (2000) (2000) Laver (2006)
1990 2000 2006
Ms-Ft 90
MSI 91 91
AN 86 79 79
LN 94 90 97
FI 63 69 72
CCDIUDC 60 59 45
PPI 36.3 36
SDI 37
DS 22
V 13 12 17
PDCI 17
PRC 9 9 14
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THE NETHERLANDS
Table 17: The Netherlands Left/Right Data
Huber Benoit
Castles Laver and Laver and
and Mair and Hunt Inglehart Laver and Mair Lubbers Laver
Party (1982) (1989) (1993) (1995) (1999) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 1995 1999 2000 2006
LPF 87
CP/CD 94 76 90
SOP 92 88 89 83 89 79 82
RPF 92 88 89 81 76
GPV 90 84 87 80 77
VVD 74 57 59 55 73 67 81
CU 70 59
CDA 57 69 59 66 55 54 66
AOV 54
Unie 55+ 52
D66 44 31 42 31 46 45 49
PvdA 26 21 36 28 38 37 40
GL 9 14 15 24 21
SP 21 21 11 14 11
PPR 16 8
CPN 8 7
PSP 6 4
Table 18: The Netherlands Immigmtion Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
LPF 92
CP/CD 97 97
SOP 77 78 68
VVD 73 78 78
CD 72 72 48
CDA 55 58 57
D66 36 41 37
PvdA 31 42 38
OL 14 20 17
SP 58 52 45
99
NORWAY
Table 19: Norway Left/Right Data
Castles Laver and Huber and Ray and Benoit
and Mair Hunt Inglehart Lubbers Narud and Laver
Party (1982) (1989) (1993) (2000) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 1998 2000 2006
FRP(n) 94 73 91 81 88 78
H 77 59 78 74 80 82
KRF 61 69 62 55 54 53
V 40 41 54 66 60 60
SP 58 56 48 42 39 34
DNA 30 28 35 40 45 36
RV 5 20 5 5
SV 12 15 17 22 19 18
Table 20: Norway Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
FRP(n) 91 92 96
H 63 59 58
KRF 46.7 47 39
V 46 36 34
SP 49 50 47
DNA 60 59 47
RV 15 15 10
SV 19 20 17
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PORTUGAL
Table 21: Portugal Left/Right Data
Huber and Benoit and
Castles and Laver and Ing1ehart Lubbers Laver
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
PDC 93
CDSIPP 87 82 82 85
PSN 81
PSD 64 60 60 70
PRD 45
PSP 39 43 43 44
MDP 21
PCP 11 29 22 19
P.xXI 20
PEV 11 24 21
DI 18
PSR 12 9
UDP 11 10
Table 22: Portugal Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
CDSIPP 65 66 77
PSN 67.4 67
PSD 56 51 61
PSP 33 37 39
PCP 19 19 20
P.XXI 10.7 11
PEV 14 14 21
PSR 7 6
UDP 12 12
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SPAIN
Table 23: Spain LeftlRight Data
Huber and Benoit and
Castles and Laver and Inglehart Lubbers Laver
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
UN/FN 98
FElons 95
DN 92
PAR 82
AP/PP 84 78 72 69 85
UCD 71
PNV 67 62 57 61 73
CiU 66 51 57 57 69
PRD 45
PSA 45
CDS 38 49
EA 41
ERC 41
PSOE 36 28 33 40 41
PCE/IU 27 18
EE 24
UCP 7 10 15 25
HB 5 22 0
MUC 7
Table 24: Spain Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
FEJons 94 93
DN 96 96
AP/PP 75 69 83
PNV 58 56 65
CiU 63
PSOE 47 38 37
PCE/IU 17
102
SWEDEN
Table 25: Sweden LeftlRight Data
Huber and Benoit and
Castles and Laver and Inglehart Lubbers Laver
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
SDk 95
ND 90 90
M 77 72 81 80 85
KDS 71 67 73 79
CP 59 54 55 60 59
FP 55 48 55 57 70
MP 30 36 35 34
SdAP 29 32 34 40 30
V 12 15 18 22 29
Table 26: Sweden Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
SDk 97 97
ND 93 93
M 60 65 55
KDS 51 54 48
CP 56 60 50
FP 32 36 30
MP 28 26 26
SdAP 56 61 37
V 23 20 21
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SWITZERLAND
Table 27: Switzerland Left/Right Data
Huber and Benoit and
Castles and Laver and Inglehart Lubbers Laver
Party Mair (1982) Hunt (1989) (1993) (2000) (2006)
1982 1989 1993 2000 2006
SD 91 95
LdT 90
EDU 88 88
APS/FPS 81 89
LPS 69 76 78
SVP 59 84 90
FDP 56 68 73
EVP 53 52
CVP 38 59 59
GPS 27 21
SPS 18 29 23
PdA 15 10
Table 28: Switzerland Immigration Data
Benoit and
Lubbers Lubbers Laver
Party (2000) (2000) (2006)
1990 2000 2006
SD 96 97 99
LdT 94 96
EDU 91 92 84
APS/FPS 91 95
LPS 66 68 64
SVP 80 91 94
FDP 61 65 65
EVP 47 45 45
CVP 54 59 52
GPS 18 17 16
SPS 27 26 16
PdA 20.6 21 16
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APPENDIXB
COUNTRY LEVEL DIAGRAMS
AUSTRIA
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GREECE
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THE NETHERLANDS
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PORTUGAL
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SWITZERLAND
Left/Right Political Space
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APPENDIXC
LIST OF PARTY ABBREVIATIONS
AUSTRIA
Abbreviation
BZO
FPO
GRCJJ\J
KPO
LiF
OVP
SPO
BELGIUM
Abbreviation
AGALEV /
Groen
CD&V
CDH
CVP
ECOLO
FDF
FNb
KPB
MR
N-VA
PRL
PS
PVV
SP/SP.A
Name
Biindnis Zukunji Osterreich
Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs
Die Griinen - Die Griine
Alternative
Kommunistische Partei
Osterreichs
Liberales Forum
Osterreichische Volkspartei
Sozialdemokratische Partei
Osterreichs
Name
Anders gaan leven
Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams
Centre Democrate Humaniste
Christelijke Volkspartij
Ecolo
Front Democratique des
Francophones
Front National
Kommunistische Partij van Belgie
Mouvement Reformateur
Nieuw- Vlaamse Alliantie
Parti Reformateur Liberal
Parti Socialiste
Partij voor de Vrijheid en
Vooruitgang
Socialistische Partij / Socialistische
Partij (Anders)
English Translation
Alliance for the Future of Austria
Freedom Party
Greens
Communist Party
Liberal Forum
People's Party
Social Democratic Party
English Translation
Live Differently (Flemish
Greens)
Christian Democrats & Flemish
Humanist Democratic Center
Christian People's Party
Francophone Greens
Francophone Democratic Front
National Front
Communist Party
Reformist Movement
New Flemish Alliance
Liberal Reform Party
Francophone Socialist Party
Party of Liberty and Progress
Socialist Party
VB
VLD
VU
Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang
Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten
Volksunie
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Flemish Bloc
Flemish Liberals and Democrats
Flemish People's Union
BRITAIN
Abbreviation Name English Translation
BNP British National Party
C Conservatives
SDP Social Democratic Party
Lib Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats
SNP Scottish National Party
L Labour
PC PlaidCymru Party of Wales
GP Green Party o/England & Wales
DENMARK
Abbreviation Name English Translation
CD Centrum-Demokraterne Centre Democrats
DF Dansk Folkeparti Danish People's Party
EL Enhedslisten - Die RfJd-GrfJne Unity List - The Red Breens
FRP(d) Fremskridtspartiet Progress Party
KD Kristendemokraterne
KF Det Konservative Folkeparti Conservative People's Party
KRF Kristeligt Folkeparti Christian People's Party
RV Det Radikale Venstre Social Liberal Party
SD Socialdemokraterne Social Democrats
SF Socialistisk Folkeparti Socialist People's Party
V Venstre - Danmarks Liberale Liberals
Parti
VS Venstresocialisterne Left Socialist Party
FRANCE
Abbreviation Name English Translation
CNIP Centre National des Independants Independents and Farmers
et Paysans
FN Front National National Front
MNR Mouvement National Republicain
MPF Mouvement pour la France Movement for France
MRG Mouvement des Radicaux de Left Radicals
Gauche
PCF Parti Communiste Fran~ais French Communist Party
PR Parti Republicain Repulican Party
PRG Parti Radical de Gauche
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PS Parti Socialiste Socialist Party
RPF Rassemblement pour la France
RPR Rassemblement pour la Rally for the Republic
Republique
UDF Union pour la Democratie Union for French Democracy
Fram;aise
UMP Union pour un Mouvement Union for a Popular Movement
Populaire
VEC Les Verts The Greens
GERMANY
Abbreviation Name English Translation
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Christian Democratic Union
CSU Christlich Soziale Union Christian Social Union
DKP Deutsche Kommunistiche Partei German Communist Party
DVU Deutsche Volksunion Germany People's Union
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei Free Democrats
G Die Grunen The Greens
NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschland
PDS Partei des Demokratischen Party ofDemocratic Socialism
Sozialismus
REP Die Republikaner The Rupublicans
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Social Democrats
Deutschelands
THE NETHERLANDS
Abbreviation Name
AOV Algemeen Ouderverbond
CD Centrum Democraten
CDA Christen-Democratisch Appel
CP Centrumpartij
CPN Communistische Partij Nederland
CU ChristenUnie
D66
EVP
GL
GPV
LN
LPF
PPR
PSP
Democraten 66
Evangelische Volkspartij
GroenLinks
Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond
Leefbaar Nederland
Lijst Pim Fortuyn
Politieke Partij Radicalen
Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij
English Translation
United Old Persons' League
Center Democrats
Christian Democratic Appeal
Communist Party
Christian Union (2000 merger of
GPVandRPF)
Democrats 66
Green Left (1990 from CPN, PSP,
PPR, and EVP)
Reformed Political Union
List Pim Fortuyn
Radical Political Party
Pacifist Socialist Party
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PvdA Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid
RPF Reformatorisch Politieke Reformed Politcal Federation
Federatie
SOP Staatskundig Gereformeerde Political Reformed Party
Partij
SP Socialistische Partij Socialist Party
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en People's Party for Freedom and
Democratie Democracy
NORWAY
Abbreviation Name English Translation
DNA Det norske Arbeiderparti Labour Party
FRP(n) Fremskrittspartiet Progress Party
H Hoyre Conservatives
KRF Kristelig Folkeparti Christian People's Party
RV Rod Valgallianse Red Electoral Alliance
SP Senterpartiet Center Party
SV Sosialistisk Venstreparti Socialist Left Party
V Venstre Liberals
PORTUGAL
Abbreviation Name English Translation
CDS/PP Partido do Centro Democratico Center Social Democrats
Social (renamed Partido Popular) (renamed Popular Party 1995)
DI Intervencao Democratica Democratic Intervention
MDP Movimento Democratico Democratic Movement
Partugues
P.xXI Politica XXI Politics XXI
PCP Partido Comunista Portugues Communist Party
PDC Partido da Demoeracia Crista Party of Christian Democracy
PEV Partido Ecologista 'Os Verdes' Greens
PRD Partido Renovador Democratico Democratic Renewal Party
PSD Partido Social Democrata Social Democratic Party
PSN Partido de Solidariedade National Solidarity Party
National
PSP Partido Socialista Portugues Socialist Party
PSR Partido Socialista Revolucionario Revolutionary Socialist Party
UDP Uniao Democratico Popular Democratic People's Union
SPAIN
Abbreviation Name English Translation
APIPP Alianza Popular/Partido Popular Popular Alliance/Popular Party -
AP & Liberal Party became PP
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CDS Centro Democratico y Social Democratic and Social Center
(successor to UCD)
CiU Convergencia y Unio Convergence and Unity
DN Democracia Nacional National Democracy
EA Eusko Alkartasuna Basque Solidarity
EE Euzkadiko Ezkerra Basque Left
ERC Esquerra Repulicana de Catalan Republican Left
Catalunya
FEJons Falange Espanola de las Juntas Spanish Phalanx of Committees
de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista for National Syndicalist Attack
HB Herri Batasuna United People
MUC Mesa per la Unidadad de los Communist Party
Comunistas
PAR Partido Aragones Regionalista Aragonese Regionalist Party
PCE/IU Partido Comunista de Communist Party/United Left
Espana/lzquierda Unida
PNV Euzko Alberdi JeltzalealPartido Basque Nationalist Party
Nacionalista Vasco
PRD Partido Reformista Democratico Democratic Reform Party
PSA Partido Socialista Andalusian Socialist Party
Andaluz?Partodo Andaluz
PSOE Partido Socilista Obrero Espanol Socialist Party
UCD Union del Centro Democratico Union ofDemocratic Center
(became CDS in 1982)
UCP Coalicion Union del Pueblo Canary People's Union
Canario
UN/FN Union Nacional/Fuerza Nueva National UnionlNew Force
SWEDEN
Abbreviation Name English Translation
CP Centerpartiet Center Party
FP Folkpartiet Liberalerna People's Party - the Liberals
KDS Kristdemokraterna Christian Democrats
M Moderata samlingspartiet Modem Unity Party
MP Miljopartiet de Grona Greens
ND Ny Demokrati New Democrats
S Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Social Democrats
arbetarparti
SDk Sverigedemokraterna Sweden Democrats
V Vansterpartiet Left Party
SWITZERLAND
Abbreviation Name English Translation
APS Autopartei der Schweiz/Parti Car Party of Switzerland
--- --------
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Automobiliste Suisse (renamed (renamed FPS)
FPSj
CVP Christlich Demokratische Christian Democratic People's
Volkspartei Party
EDU Eidgenossich-Demokratische Federal Democratic Union
Union
EVP Evangelische Volkspartei der Protestant People's Party
Schweiz
FDP Freisinnige-Demokratische Partei Radical Democrats
der Schweiz
FPS Freiheitspartei der Schweiz (was Freedom Party of Switzerland
APSj (was APS)
GPS Griine Partei der Schweiz Green Party
LdT Lega dei Ticinesi Ticino Legue
LPS Liberale Partei der Schweiz Liberal Party
PdA Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz Labour Party
SD Schweizer Demokraten Swiss Democrats
SPS Sozialdemokratische Partei der Social Democrats
Scheweiz
SVP Schweizerische Volkspartei Swiss People's Party
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